

IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Appln. No: 09/977,826
Applicant: George Goicoechea et al.
Filed: October 15, 2001
Title: ENDOLUMINAL STENT
TC/A.U.: 3774
Examiner: William Matthews
Confirmation No.: 4645
Docket No.: BSI-010US4
Notice of Appeal Filed: June 12, 2008
Docket No.: BSI-010US4

APPEAL BRIEF UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.37

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Commissioner for Patents
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S I R :

Appellants hereby request consideration and reversal of the Final Rejection dated March 24, 2008 of claims 20, 22-25, 27-33, 39, 41, 43-49 and 54-57.

This Brief is presented in the format required by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37, in order to facilitate review by the Board. In compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(a)(1), this Brief is being filed within the time allowed for response to the action from which the Appeal was taken, within two months from the date of the Notice of Appeal, or within an extension of that time period.

The fees for filing a Brief in support of an Appeal under 37 C.F.R. § 41.20(b)(2), together with any extension fee required in connection with the filing of this Brief, are provided herewith.

I. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

The real Party In Interest in this matter is Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. by virtue of Articles of Merger of Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. with and its Scimed Life Systems, Inc. dated December 22, 2004.

II. RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

There are no related appeals or interferences related to the subject matter of this Appeal, except as follows:

Interference No. 104,083. A copy of the Judgment of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in this Interference is provided in the Related Proceedings Appendix (Section X) at Tab 1. This Interference involved related Application Serial No. 08/461,402 of Andrew H. Cragg et al., filed June 5, 1995, titled BIFURCATED ENDOLUMINAL PROSTHESIS.

Interference No. 104,192. A copy of the Final Decision and Judgment of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in this Interference is provided in the Related Proceedings Appendix (Section X) at Tab 2. This Interference also involved related Application Serial No. 08/461,402.

Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL). This was an appeal from the Board's decision in Interference No. 104,192. The following interlocutory orders, and/or decisions, memorandum opinion, and final judgment were entered in that appeal, with copies included in the Related Proceedings Appendix (Section X) at the indicated Tabs:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ORDER OR OPINION</u>	<u>TAB</u>
11/15/01	Order	3
12/21/01	Order	4
5/2/02	Order	5
8/30/03	Memorandum Opinion and Order	6
3/25/04	Stipulation and Order	7
9/12/04	Protective Order	8
12/14/04	Joint Stipulated Request To Extend Discovery	9
3/31/06	Memorandum Opinion	10
3/31/06	Final Judgment	11

Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. (formerly known as Scimed Life Systems, Inc.) v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc. (also known as Medtronic AVE, Inc.), United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, No. 2006-1434. This was an appeal from the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. A copy of the decision of the Federal Circuit is provided in the Related Proceedings Appendix (Section X) at Tab 12.

III. STATUS OF CLAIMS

Claims 20, 22-41, 43-49 and 54-62 are pending. Claims 26, 34-38, 40, and 58-62 have been withdrawn from consideration. Claims 1-19, 21, 42, 50-53 have been canceled. Claims 20, 22-25, 27-33, 39, 41, 43-49, and 54-57 stand rejected and are being appealed. A copy of the rejected claims is provided in the Claims Appendix (Section VIII).

To assist the Board in correlating dependent claims with their corresponding independent claims, appellants provide the following chart of the pending claims that have not been withdrawn:

20	Dependent on claim 54
22	Dependent on claim 20
23	Dependent on claim 20
24	Dependent on claim 20
25	Dependent on claim 20
27	Dependent on claim 20
28	Dependent on claim 27
29	Dependent on claim 28
30	Dependent on claim 29
31	Dependent on claim 54
32	Dependent on claim 54
33	Dependent on claim 32
39	Dependent on claim 54
41	Dependent on claim 31
43	Dependent on claim 54
44	Dependent on claim 43
45	Dependent on claim 44
46	Dependent on claim 44
47	Dependent on claim 43
48	Dependent on claim 47
49	Dependent on claim 47
54	Independent
55	Dependent on claim 20

56 Independent
57 Dependent on claim 56

IV. STATUS OF AMENDMENTS

No amendment to the claims was filed subsequent to the Final Office Action.

V. SUMMARY OF CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER

A. Claim 54

The invention recited in claim 54 is a stent including a plurality of hoops aligned along a common axis. Each of the hoops is non-helical and oriented in a plane that is substantially perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the stent. Each of the hoops includes a plurality of elongate elements that are joined to one another and form apices that point in a direction along the longitudinal axis of the stent. The stent also includes means for securing an apex of one hoop to an abutting juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop.

For example, and for purposes of illustration only, one exemplary embodiment of the invention is shown as stent 10 in Fig. 1A (page 19, lines 5-7; page 22, lines 17-18). Part of a stent such as stent 10 is also shown in Figs. 2A (page 19, lines 11-13; page 23, lines 11-12), 3 (page 19, lines 17-19; page 25, line 27-page 26, line 1), and 4A (page 19, lines 20-22; page 22, lines 17-18). The stent includes a plurality of hoops. For example, the exemplary proximal part 12 of stent 10 (Fig. 1A) is formed of a plurality of hoops such as hoops 20 (Figs. 1A, 2A; page 23, lines 11-15; page 24, lines 8-13). Each hoop is non-helical and is oriented in a plane that is substantially perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the stent (page 9, lines 15-19, 13-19; page 10, lines 16-17).

Each of the hoops includes a plurality of elongate elements that are joined to one another and form apices such as apices 22 (Fig. 2A, page 23, lines 11-20) that point in a direction along the longitudinal axis of the stent (page 9, lines 19-27; page 23, lines 24-27).

The stent also has means for securing an apex of one hoop to a juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop (page 10, lines 16-23 and Figs. 1A, 1B, 2A, 4A-4F). This feature is recited in terms of means plus function under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(v), the following

paragraphs set forth exemplary structures described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function.

The securing means may comprise a loop element of a suture material, for example, to tie the abutting juxtaposed apices together. The loop element may also comprise a loop formed of a thermoplastics material such, for example, as polypropylene. Alternatively, the securing means may be a bead formed of a thermoplastic material around juxtaposed apices. Also alternatively, the securing means may be a loop, ring, or staple formed of wire such as nitinol (page 10, lines 20-28). FIGS. 4B-4F are partial exploded views of embodiments of a stent illustrating exemplary means for securing juxtaposed apices of the stent (page 20, lines 1-4).

Referring to Fig. 4A, for example, abutting juxtaposed apices 22 of neighboring hoops 20 are secured together by securing means 99 which may be, for example, 0.003" polypropylene filaments. Each apex 22 of each hoop 20 which has an abutting juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop 20 is tied to the abutting juxtaposed apex 22 in this embodiment. In other embodiments of the invention, only some of the juxtaposed apices 22 may be secured in this way (page 25, lines 4-11).

In addition to polypropylene filaments, the securing means may comprise a loop element 99a of a suture material, for example, to tie the juxtaposed apices together, as shown in FIG. 4B. The securing means may also comprise a bead 99b formed of a thermoplastic material around juxtaposed apices, as shown in FIG. 4C. Also alternatively, the securing means may be a loop 99c, ring 99d, or staple 99e formed of wire such as nitinol, as shown in FIGS. 4D, 4E, and 4F respectively (page 25, lines 12-21).

The foregoing, exemplary structures correspond to the function recited in claim 54 of securing an apex of one hoop to an abutting juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop. Equivalent structures for securing an apex of one hoop to a juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop are also within the literal scope of claim 54 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph.

B. Claim 56

The invention recited in claim 56 is a stent including a tubular member that has a plurality of hoops aligned adjacent one another along the

longitudinal axis of the tubular member. Each of the hoops has a plurality of elongate elements. Pairs of the elongate elements meet one another and form vertices that axially point in a direction along the longitudinal axis of the stent. At least some of the vertices axially abut and are individually connected to oppositely pointed vertices of elongate elements of an adjacent hoop. The vertices of each hoop that are pointed in the axial direction lie in a common plane that is perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the tubular member.

For example, and for purposes of illustration only, and according to one exemplary embodiment of the invention, a stent such as stent 10 includes a tubular member (page 8, lines 8-10). The stent includes a plurality of hoops. For example, the exemplary proximal part 12 of stent 10 (Fig. 1A) is formed of a plurality of hoops such as hoops 20 (Figs. 1A, 2A; page 23, lines 11-15; page 24, lines 8-13). The exemplary hoops are aligned adjacent one another along the longitudinal axis of the tubular member (Fig. 1A; page 9, lines 19-27; page 23, lines 24-27).

Each of the hoops includes a plurality of elongate elements. Pairs of the elongate elements meet one another and form vertices such as vertices 22 (Fig. 2A, page 23, lines 11-20) that axially point in a direction along the longitudinal axis of the stent (page 9, lines 19-27; page 23, lines 24-27).

At least some of the vertices axially abut (Figs. 2A, 4A) and are individually connected to oppositely pointed vertices of elongate elements of an adjacent hoop (Figs. 2A, 4A). For example, a loop element of a suture material connects oppositely pointed vertices of adjacent hoops (page 10, lines 18-23). Exemplary suture material is shown as element 99a in Fig. 4B (page 25, lines 13-15). Other materials for connecting oppositely pointed vertices of adjacent hoops are shown in Figs 4A and 4C to 4F (page 25, lines 4-21).

The vertices of each hoop that are pointed in the axial direction lie in a common plane that is perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the tubular member (page 9, lines 15-19; page 10, lines 2-5).

VI. GROUNDS OF REJECTION TO BE REVIEWED ON APPEAL

The following provides a concise statement of each ground of rejection presented for review:

Whether claims 20, 22-25, 27-33, 39, 41, 43-49 and 54-57 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement, as set forth in the Final Office Action.

VII. ARGUMENT

Paragraph 4 of the Final Office Action has rejected claims 20, 22-25, 27-33, 39, 41, 43-49 and 54-57 under 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, for allegedly failing to comply with the written description requirement. It generally contends that the claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventors, at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

Paragraphs 5-7 of the Final Office Action provide more specific reasons for the rejections. Paragraph 2 of the Final Office Action explains why the Examiner disagreed with Applicants' arguments regarding claims 56 and 57 in their December 26, 2007 Request for Reconsideration.

EXAMINATION REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT A REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH

"An applicant shows possession of the claimed invention by describing the claimed invention with all of its limitations using such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, and formulas that fully set forth the claimed invention." MPEP § 2163, Rev. 5, Aug. 2006, p. 2100-166. "The subject matter of the claim need not be described literally (i.e., using the same terms or *in haec verba*) in order for the disclosure to satisfy the description requirement." MPEP §2163.02. In addition to not requiring *in haec verba* claims, the MPEP states that newly added claim limitations may be supported in the specification through express, implicit, or inherent disclosure. MPEP § 2163, p. 2100-168. "The fundamental factual inquiry is whether the specification conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed." MPEP § 2163, p. 2100-169.

"The examiner has the initial burden, after a thorough reading and evaluation of the content of the application, of presenting evidence or reasons why a person skilled in the art would not recognize that the written description of the invention provides support for the claims." MPEP § 2163 II.A., p. 2100-169. *Accord*, MPEP §

Accord, MPEP § 2163 II.A.3(b), p. 2100-177. "Prior to determining whether the disclosure satisfies the written description requirement for the claimed subject matter, the examiner should review the claims and the entire specification, including the specific embodiments, figures, and sequence listings, to understand how applicant provides support for the various features of the claimed invention." MPEP 2163 II.A.2, p. 2100-171 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

"In rejecting a claim, the examiner must set forth express findings of fact regarding the above analysis which support the lack of written description conclusion. These findings should:

- (A) Identify the claim limitation at issue; and
- (B) Establish a *prima facie* case by providing reasons why a person skilled in the art at the time the application was filed would not have recognized that the inventor was in possession of the invention claimed in view of the disclosure of the application as filed." MPEP §2163 III.A., p. 2100-178; § 2163.04 I.

THE REJECTION OF CLAIM 54 AND ITS DEPENDENT CLAIMS 20, 22-25, 27-33, 39, 41, 43-49, 55

Contrary To The Final Office Action's Contention,
The Disclosure Does Support "Means For Securing
An Apex Of One Hoop To An Abutting Juxtaposed
Apex Of A Neighboring Hoop"

Paragraph 5 of the Final Office Action has rejected these claims because independent claim 54 recites vertices that abut which, in the Examiner's view, is not disclosed in the specification. Instead, the Examiner contends that the specification only discloses juxtaposed vertices, which, he contends, may or may not imply contact.

Claim 54 recites, in part, "means for securing an apex of one hoop to an abutting juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop." Even though Applicants' specification does not expressly use the term "abut," a person skilled in the art would recognize that the specification (including the figures) implicitly and inherently supports these claim limitations. The Examiner, on the other hand, has not established a *prima facie* case, with reasons, explaining why a person skilled in

the art would not have recognized that Applicants' disclosure shows they were in possession of the claimed invention.

The specification states, in part

Typically, the stents of this invention whether of the helical or perpendicular variety, also comprise a securing means for securing an apex of the sinuous wire in one hoop to a juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop so that each hoop is supported by its neighbors. The securing means may comprise a loop element of a suture material, for example, to tie the juxtaposed apices together. . . .
(page 10, lines 16-23)

This passage states that an apex of one hoop is secured to a juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop "so that each hoop is supported by its neighbors." It also states that "a suture material. . . tie[s] juxtaposed apices together." One skilled in the art would recognize that the specification at least implicitly and inherently describes an embodiment including abutting apices, thereby supporting the claim language at least implicitly and inherently. The Examiner has not provided any evidence or reasons demonstrating that a person skilled in the art at the time the application was filed would not have recognized that the inventors were in possession of the claimed invention in view of the above passages in the disclosure.

One skilled in the art would also recognize that claim 54 finds clear support in stent embodiments such as those selected for illustration in Figs. 1A, 1B, 2A, 4A, and 4B-4F. (page 19, lines 11-12, 20-21). These figures clearly show embodiments having "means for securing an apex of one hoop to an abutting juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop." The Examiner has not explained why a person skilled in the art would not recognize that the figures show this feature.

As stated above, the subject matter of a claim need not be described *in haec verba*. Consideration of the specification and the figures, undertaken from the standpoint of one of skill in the art, "conveys with reasonable clarity" that Applicants were in possession of the claimed invention. MPEP § 2163, p. 2100-169.

In contrast, the Examiner has not presented evidence or reasons why a person skilled in the art would not recognize that the written description of the invention, including the figures and passages specifically identified above, supports

claim 54. Paragraph 5 of the Final Office Action states: “[t]he specification only discloses juxtaposed vertices.” This statement fails to provide evidence that a person skilled in the art would not recognize that the Applicants had possession of the claimed invention. It fails to recognize the embodiments described by the specification and the figures.

Paragraph 5 of the Final Office Action also contends that “the attachment mechanisms at page 10 lines 16-23 do not imply the apices must abut (as a weld or adhesive means would imply).” The Examiner’s contentions disregard not only page 10, lines 16-23 but also other significant aspects of Applicants’ disclosure and fail to present required evidence demonstrating that a person skilled in the art would not recognize that the Applicants had possession of the claimed invention.

Applicants’ specification also states:

[J]uxtaposed apices 22 of neighboring hoops 20 are secured together by securing means 99 (see Figure 4(a)), which are, in this example, 0.003” polypropylene filaments. Each apex 22 of each hoop 20 which has a juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop 20 is tied to the juxtaposed apex 22. (page 25, lines 4-9)

In addition to polypropylene filaments, the securing means may comprise a loop element 99a of a suture material, for example, to tie the juxtaposed apices together, as shown in Fig. 4(b). The securing means may also comprise bead 99b formed of a thermoplastic material around juxtaposed apices, as shown in Fig. 4(c). Also alternatively, the securing means may be a loop 99c, ring 99d, or staple 99e formed of wire such as nitinol, as shown in Fig. 4(d), 4(e), and 4(f) respectively. (page 25, lines 12-21).

These passages explain the relationship of juxtaposed apices that can be tied together or secured together as shown in Figures 4A through 4F, each of which also shows an embodiment having abutting apices. Taken together, the disclosure’s statement that juxtaposed apices can be tied together or secured together, along with Figures 4A through 4F, combined with the explanation that “each hoop is supported by its neighbors” would inexorably lead one skilled in the art to conclude

that the juxtaposed apices of at least some disclosed embodiments are abutting. The Examiner has not presented any evidence to the contrary.

For all of the above reasons, Applicants' specification discloses "means for securing an apex of one hoop to an abutting juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop."

Claim 54 also recites, in part,

a plurality of hoops aligned along a common axis, each of said hoops being non-helical and oriented in a plane substantially perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the stent.

Paragraph 6 of the Final Office Action has rejected claim 54 and its dependent claims "because independent claim 54 recites 'non-helical' in combination with each hoop being substantially perpendicular and having connected apices." In the Examiner's view, "[t]he specification only disclose [sic] embodiments wherein each hoop is substantially perpendicular and has connected apices and has a helical 'offset' feature."

Applicants' specification expressly describes two alternative categories of embodiments of hoops -- helical and substantially perpendicular. The specification states:

In some embodiments the wire may have a helical configuration as disclosed in EP-A-0556850. Alternatively, the wire may be of an entirely novel configuration, namely one in which the wire forms a plurality of hoops such that the plane of the circumference of each hoop is substantially perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the stent. (page 9, lines 13-19)

One of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the specification conveys with reasonable clarity a plurality of embodiments and features. One described embodiment is a helical configuration. One of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the alternative to the helical embodiment described in the specification is not helical because the specification describes an alternative to a helical embodiment. That is, one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that at least one alternatively described embodiment is non-helical.

This portion of the specification also makes clear that embodiments of Applicants' invention may be helical or perpendicular: "[t]ypically, the stents of this

invention [are] of the helical or perpendicular variety.” (page 10, lines 16-17). The phrase “helical or perpendicular variety” confirms that the “perpendicular variety” embodiment is an explicitly disclosed example of a non-helical alternative to the helical variety.

As indicated above, paragraph 6 of the Office Action contends that the application does not disclose “‘non-helical’ in combination with each hoop being substantially perpendicular and having connected apices.” To the contrary, the specification does disclose such an embodiment (although not *in haec verba*) by stating:


Typically, the stents of this invention . . . of the . . . perpendicular variety, also comprise a securing means for securing an apex of the sinuous wire in one hoop to a juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop so that each hoop is supported by its neighbors. (page 10, lines 16-20)

One of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that this paragraph also provides support for the claimed combination.

In paragraph 2, at the top of page 3¹, the Final Office Action indicates that it has interpreted “non-helical” to require that the claimed embodiment “lack[s] **any** helical features.” Based upon this interpretation of “non-helical,” the Examiner contends that Fig. 4A shows “a helical aspect (i.e. the longitudinal displacements described at page 23 lines 24-27).”

But page 23, lines 24-27 describes Figs. 2A and 2B, not Fig. 4A, and describes how hoops 20a and 20b in those figures are formed. Figs. 2A and 2B are reproduced below, with reference numbers 23A, 23B and 23C added to Fig. 2A for the Board’s ease of reference.

¹ The opening sentence of paragraph 2 of the Final Office Action states that it only pertains to claims 56 and 57. Since claims 56-57 do not contain a “non-helical” recitation, the Examiner’s contentions regarding “non-helical” must pertain to claim 54.

FIG. 2A

The referenced portion of the specification states:

When one hoop 20 e.g. the hoop indicated at 20a has been formed, the point of winding of the nitinol wire is displaced longitudinally with respect to the axis of mandrel 46 to form the next successive hoop 20b.

Hoops 20a and 20b are shown in both figures.

Part of hoop 20a is formed by wire portion 23A. In order to form the adjoining hoop 20b, the point of winding of wire portion 23A is displaced longitudinally at wire portion 23B, and becomes wire portion 23C. Apparently, the Examiner contends that wire portion 23B precludes Applicants from reciting "hoops being non-helical." The Examiner is wrong.

The recitation at issue is: "**hoops** being non-helical." Figs. 1A, 1B, 2A, 3, 4A all show embodiments of non-helical **hoops**. Regardless of how the hoops are formed, and regardless of how one hoop flows into another hoop, the **hoops themselves** are non-helical. The disclosure therefore supports "**hoops** being non-helical."

For all of the above reasons, Applicants' disclosure demonstrates that they had possession of this aspect of the claimed invention.

THE REJECTION OF CLAIM 56 AND ITS DEPENDENT CLAIM 57

Contrary To The Final Office Action's Contention,
The Disclosure Does Support "At Least Some Of
Said Vertices Axially Abut"

Claim 56 recites, in part,

at least some of said vertices axially abut and are individually
connected to oppositely pointed vertices of elongate elements of an
adjacent hoop.

In addition to the contentions stated in paragraph 4 of the Final Office
Action, the Examiner's reasoning is further explained in paragraph 2 of the Final
Office Action, which contends that

the use of "a suture loop" to tie adjacent or juxtaposed apices does
not expressly, implicitly, or inherently require contact between the
apices. In fact, the teachings at page 10, lines 16-23 raise the
question of how tightly or loosely the suture is tied. These teachings
are not equivalent to a connection created by adhesive or welding.

As was the case regarding claim 54, even though Applicants' specification
does not expressly use the term "abut," a person skilled in the art would recognize
that the specification (including the figures) expressly, implicitly, and inherently
supports these claim limitations. In addition, the Examiner has not established a
prima facie case, with reasons, explaining why a person skilled in the art would not
have recognized that Applicants' disclosure shows they were in possession of the
claimed invention.

As Applicants argued above regarding the rejection of claim 54, the
specification describes, and the figures illustrate, embodiments in which "each hoop
is supported by its neighbors" (page 10, line 20), "vertices . . . are individually
connected to oppositely pointed vertices" using various connecting elements (page
10, lines 23-29; page 25, lines 4-9, 12-21), and apices are tied together. See also,
Figs. 1A, 1B, 2A, and 4A-4F.

Taken together, the specification and the figures demonstrate that "at least
some of said vertices axially abut and are individually connected to oppositely
pointed vertices of elongate elements of an adjacent hoop."

The Final Office Action has disregarded the above-described teachings in the specification because, in its view, the teachings "are not equivalent to a connection created by adhesive or welding." This statement makes the unsupported assumption that any two things (including juxtaposed apices) can abut only if they are connected by adhesive or welding or only if they are connected by something that is equivalent to adhesive or welding. The Board must reject these contentions because the Examiner has not supported them with any evidence and because they are clearly wrong. For example, a pencil resting on a desk top abuts the desk top even though the pencil is not connected to the desk top at all or by adhesive, welding, or anything equivalent to adhesive or welding. Applicants' disclosure demonstrates embodiments in which apices abut, even though the disclosure does not expressly refer to adhesive or welding.

For all of the above reasons, Applicants' disclosure demonstrates that they had possession of this aspect of the claimed invention.

Claim 56 also recites, in part:

vertices of each hoop pointed in the axial direction lie in a common plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the tubular member.

Paragraph 7 of the Final Office Action has rejected claims 56 and 57 because, in the view of the Examiner, the specification does not provide support for the recitation that vertices of "each hoop" lie in a common plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the tubular member. In the view of the Examiner, the specification only supports a recitation that for the perpendicular embodiment apices of "one or more" hoops lie in such a plane. The Final Office Action also contends that only a recitation of "substantially perpendicular" is supported by the description of Figs. 1-4. Applicants disagree.

The specification contains broad language generally describing selected embodiments of its disclosed stents as being of a "perpendicular variety." (page 10, line 17) One exemplary embodiment may have hoops that are "substantially perpendicular to the longitudinal axis" (page 23, lines 21-22, discussing Fig. 2A). Other exemplary embodiments of the perpendicular variety are straight stents (page 44, lines 19-20) having hoops that are "perpendicular to a common axis." (page 44, lines 22-23, discussing Figs. 22 and 23).

Figs. 1A and 2A, among other figures, illustrate an embodiment of a stent 10 (page 22, lines 17-18) having hoops 20. (page 23, line 11-page 24, line 13). "Each hoop 20 is wound onto mandrel 46 such that the plane of the circumference of each hoop 20 is substantially perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the mandrel." (page 23, lines 20-23)

Fig. 22 illustrates another embodiment of a stent using configurations such as the stent configurations described in Figs. 1A and 2A. Fig. 22 illustrates, for example, a stent embodiment having a proximal portion 401 "formed of a number of longitudinally spaced hoops 20 as described in connection with the formation of stent 10 above." (page 45, lines 5-7). The stent embodiment illustrated in Fig. 22 also has a distal portion 402 having additional similar hoops 20. (page 45, lines 10-12). This embodiment is also a stent of the "perpendicular variety." (page 44, lines 21-23) ("each of the requests comprising one or more adjacent hoops, perpendicular to a common axis").

Since the stent embodiment shown in Figs. 1A, 2A and stent embodiments shown in Figs. 22, 23 are both of the "perpendicular variety," and since both stents may be formed in the same way, one skilled in the art would understand that either of the stents could be formed of perpendicular hoops.

In addition, Fig. 1A, illustrating stent embodiment 10, clearly shows "vertices of each hoop pointed in the axial direction lie in a common plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the tubular member." As indicated by the MPEP, the PTO must consider Applicants' figures when construing their full disclosure. The specification cannot be considered in a vacuum, without giving full weight to the clear teachings of the figures.

Page 3 of the Final Office Action has mischaracterized Applicants' arguments. Applicants have not suggested that "it would be obvious to interchange features of the Figure 1a/2a embodiment and Figure 22/23 embodiments." As explained above, Fig. 22 illustrates, for example, a stent embodiment having a proximal portion 401 "formed of a number of longitudinally spaced hoops 20 as described in connection with the formation of stent 10 above." (page 45, lines 5-7). As stated above, therefore, since both stent embodiments may be formed in the same way, one skilled in the art would understand that either of the stents could be formed of perpendicular hoops. Contrary to the belief of the Examiner, therefore, one skilled


in the art would understand that the specification does interrelate at least Figs. 1-4 with at least Figs. 22 and 23. The Final Office Action fails to demonstrate that one skilled in the art would not have such an understanding.

For the above reasons, Applicants' disclosure fully supports the phrase "the vertices of each hoop pointed in the axial direction lie in a common plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the tubular member."

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing remarks, Applicants submit that the grounds for rejection of claims 20, 22-25, 27-33, 39, 41, 43-49, and 54-57 are improper. Applicants respectfully request that the Board reverse the Examiner's rejection of all pending rejected claims.

Respectfully submitted,


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The Director is hereby authorized to charge or credit Deposit Account No. **18-0350** for any additional fees, or any underpayment or credit for overpayment in connection herewith.

VIII. CLAIMS APPENDIX

1-19 (Canceled)

20. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 54 comprising at least one stent segment in combination with one or more additional stent segments.

21. (Canceled)

22. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 20 wherein said one or more additional segments are axially aligned with one another.

23. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 20 wherein said one or more additional segments are secured to one another by connecting means connecting at least some of the apices of hoops at mating ends of said stent and said additional segments.

24. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 20 wherein adjacent hoops are of the same diameter.

25. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 20 wherein adjacent hoops are of a different diameter.

26. (Withdrawn) A stent as recited in claim 22 wherein said axially aligned segments are connected to one another by a tubular fabric element.

27. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 20 wherein a first additional segment is axially parallel to, but non-common co-axial with, said stent segment.

28. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 27 further comprising a second additional segment axially parallel to said stent segment, but non-co-axial with either said stent segment or said first additional stent segment.

29. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 28 wherein at least one of said first and second additional stent segments is of frustoconical shape

and is further combined with a third an additional stent segment, one end of which includes a mating frustoconical shape.

30. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 29, wherein said mating frustoconical stent segments are adapted to be separately placed in a bifurcated artery and then, by expansion of one of said frustoconical stent segments, secured to one another.

31. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 wherein said hoops are formed of a single continuous wire.

32. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 wherein said securing means is a suture.

33. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 32 wherein said suture is a tied loop of thermoplastic material.

34. (Withdrawn) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 wherein said securing means is a suture.

35. (Withdrawn) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 wherein said securing means is a staple.

36. (Withdrawn) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 wherein said securing means is wire twisted into loop.

37. (Withdrawn) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 36 wherein said wire is nitinol.

38. (Withdrawn) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 wherein said securing means is bead of thermoplastic material.

39. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 wherein each longitudinal end of the stent is substantially perpendicular square to the longitudinal axis of the stent.

40. (Withdrawn) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 wherein said stent is at least partially covered in fabric.

41. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 31 wherein said wire is nitinol.

42. (Canceled)

43. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 54 further comprising a radiopaque marker disposed on at least one end of the stent.

44. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 43 wherein said radiopaque marker comprises a radiopaque element attached to one end of said stent.

45. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 44 wherein said element is a platinum wire.

46. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 44 wherein said element is a gold wire.

47. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 43 wherein said radiopaque marker comprises a radiopaque tube disposed around a part of said stent.

48. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 47 wherein said tube is platinum.

49. (Previously Presented) An endoluminal stent as claimed in claim 47 wherein said tube is gold.

50-53. (Cancelled)

54. (Previously Presented) A stent comprising:

a plurality of hoops aligned along a common axis, each of said hoops being non-helical and oriented in a plane substantially perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the stent, and each of said hoops including a plurality of elongate elements joined to one another and forming apices that point in a direction along the longitudinal axis of the stent; and

means for securing an apex of one hoop to an abutting juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop.

55. (Previously Presented) A stent as recited in claim 20 wherein at least one of said additional stent segments comprises:

a plurality of hoops aligned along a common axis, each of said hoops oriented in a plane substantially perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the additional stent segment, and each of said hoops including a plurality of elongate elements joined to one another and forming apices that point in a direction along the longitudinal axis of the additional stent segment; and

means for securing an apex of one hoop to a juxtaposed apex of a neighboring hoop.

56. (Previously Presented) A stent comprising a tubular member having a plurality of hoops aligned adjacent one another along the longitudinal axis of said tubular member, each of said hoops comprising a plurality of elongate elements, with pairs of said elongate elements meeting one another and forming vertices axially pointing in a direction along the longitudinal axis of the stent, wherein at least some of said vertices axially abut and are individually connected to oppositely pointed vertices of elongate elements of an adjacent hoop, wherein the vertices of each hoop pointed in the axial direction lie in a common plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the tubular member.

57. (Previously Presented) A stent according to claim 56, wherein at least one elongate element in each hoop is a continuation of an elongate element of an adjacent hoop.

58. (Withdrawn) A method of reinforcing a body vessel using a tubular sheath disposed between an entry location in a body and an implantation location, said method comprising the steps of:

- a. providing a stent as recited in claim 56;
- b. compressing the stent into its compressed configuration;
- c. inserting the compressed stent into the tubular sheath;
- d. delivering the compressed stent through the tubular sheath to the implantation location; and
- e. withdrawing the sheath while holding the stent at the implantation location within the vessel and expanding the stent within the implantation location as the sheath is withdrawn by permitting the self-expandable stent, as the constraint of the sheath is removed to return to said expanded configuration;

whereby the stent is securely disposed in the implanted state against said body vessel.

59. (Withdrawn) A method according to claim 58, wherein said stent is comprised of a shape memory material.

60. (Withdrawn) A method according to claim 59, wherein said shape memory material is nitinol and step (b) is performed at low temperature.

61. (Withdrawn) A method according to claim 58, wherein at least one elongate element in each hoop is a continuation of an elongate element of an adjacent hoop.

62. (Withdrawn) A prosthesis for placement in a body lumen comprising a tubular graft supported and adapted to be retained in said lumen by a stent as recited in claim 56.

IX. EVIDENCE APPENDIX

None.

X. RELATED PROCEEDINGS APPENDIX

Tab 1 Judgment of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in Interference No. 104,083.

Tab 2 Final Decision and Judgment of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in Interference No. 104,192.

Tab 3 11/15/01 Order, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 4 12/21/01 Order, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 5 5/2/02 Order, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 6 8/30/03 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 7 3/25/04 Stipulation and Order, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 8 9/12/04 Protective Order, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 9 12/14/04 Joint Stipulated Request To Extend Discovery, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 10 3/31/06 Memorandum Opinion, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 11 3/31/06 Final Judgment, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL).

Tab 12 8/8/07 Decision, Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. (formerly known as Scimed Life Systems, Inc.) v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc. (also known as Medtronic AVE, Inc.), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, No. 2006-1434.

TAB 1

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MAR 12 1999

BSI-944

THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION

RATNER & PRESTIA

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today (1) was not written for publication in a law journal and (2) is not binding precedent of the Board.

Paper No. 33

Filed by: Trial Section Merits Panel
Box Interference
Washington, D.C. 20231
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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

MAILED

MAR 10 1999

ERIC C. MARTIN,

Junior Party
(Patent No. 5,575,817)¹,

PAT. & T.M. OFFICE
BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

v.

ANDREW H. CRAGG, and MICHAEL D. DAKE

Senior Party
(Application 08/461,402)²

Patent Interference No. 104,083

Before McKelvey, Senior Administrative Patent Judge, Schafer, Lee
and Torczon, Administrative patent Judges.

PER CURIAM

JUDGMENT

Junior party Martin has failed to serve its case-in-chief
testimony on priority by the time such service was due, i.e.,

¹ Filed August 19, 1994.

² Assigned to Boston Scientific Technology, Inc. Accorded the benefit of European applications EP9440284.9, filed February 9, 1994, and EP94401306.9, filed June 10, 1994. Also accorded the benefit of U.S. applications 08/317,763, filed October 4, 1994, and 08/312,881, filed September 27, 1994.

Interference No. 104,083
Martin v. Cragg

March 1, 1999. Based on party Martin's failure to take testimony, party Cragg has filed a miscellaneous motion for judgment or a show cause order under 37 CFR § 1.652.

In a telephone conference conducted at 2:45 PM, March 8, 1999, between administrative patent judge Jameson Lee and counsel to the respective parties, Mr. Peter Davis, counsel to party Martin, indicated that the failure to serve its case-in-chief evidence was not inadvertent and that the junior party would have no objection to the Board's entering adverse judgment against party Martin on the basis that its case-in-chief evidence was not served. Accordingly, entry of judgment against party Martin is now appropriate.

It is **ORDERED** that judgment as to the subject matter of count 1 is entered against junior party Martin and awarded in favor of senior party Cragg.

It is **ORDERED** that Eric C. Martin is not entitled to a patent containing claim 1 of his involved patent, which corresponds to count 1.

It is **ORDERED** that on this record, Andrew H. Cragg and Michael D. Dake are entitled to a patent containing their application claim 89 which corresponds to the count.

It is **ORDERED** that upon return of party Cragg's involved application to the primary examiner, party Cragg shall inform the

Interference No. 104,083
Martin v. Cragg

examiner of the administrative patent judge's decision (Paper No. 20) granting party Cragg's motion to correct inventorship (Paper No. 16), and request that the correction, inclusive of the accompanying petition and amendment, be processed and entered in the official file of party Cragg's involved application.

It is **FURTHER ORDERED** that in light of this entry of judgment, party Cragg's motion for judgment or an order to show cause why judgment should not be entered against party Martin is dismissed as moot.

Fred Mckelvey

Fred E. Mckelvey, Senior
Administrative Patent Judge)

Richard E. Schafer

Richard E. Schafer
Administrative Patent Judge)

Jameson Lee

Jameson Lee
Administrative Patent Judge)

Richard Torczon

Richard Torczon
Administrative Patent Judge)

BOARD OF PATENT
APPEALS
AND
INTERFERENCES

Interference No. 104,083
Martin v. Cragg

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TAB 2

The opinion in support of the decision being entered
today is not binding precedent of the Board.

Filed by: Trial Section Merits Panel
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Paper No. 187

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

ANDREW H. CRAGG and MICHAEL D. DAKE,

Junior Party,
(Application 08/461,402),¹

MAILED

v.

JUL 27 2001

ERIC C. MARTIN,

Junior Party,
(Application 5,575,817),²

**PAT. & T.M. OFFICE
BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES**

v..

THOMAS J. FOGARTY, JAY A. LENKER,
TIMOTHY J. RYAN and KIRSTEN FREISLINGER,

Senior Party,
(Application 08/463,836).³

Patent Interference No. 104,192

¹ Filed 06/05/95. Accorded the benefit of application 08/317,763, filed October 4, 1994, now Patent No. 5,609,627, and application 08/312,881, filed September 27, 1994. The real party in interest is Boston Scientific Technology, Inc.

² Based on application 08/293,541, filed August 19, 1994.

³ Filed June 5, 1995. Accorded the benefit of application 08/255,681, filed June 8, 1994. The real party in interest is Medtronic Aneurx, Inc.

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JUL 30 2001

RATNER & PRESTIA

Interference No. 104,192
Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

Before McKELVEY, Senior Administrative Patent Judge, and SCHAFER,
LEE and MEDLEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEE, Administrative Patent Judge.

FINAL DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Introduction

When this interference was declared on April 23, 1998, current junior party Cragg was then senior party Goicoechea. Because of the granting of a motion to correct inventorship in related Interference No. 104,083 for application 08/461,402, the same application that is involved in this interference, co-inventors George Goicoechea, John Hudson, and Claude Mialhe were deleted and the only remaining inventors in that application are Andrew H. Cragg and Michael D. Dake. Thus, party Goicoechea became party Cragg. Any reference to party Goicoechea should be understood as a reference to party Cragg.

A decision on the parties' preliminary motions was rendered on February 11, 2000 (Paper No. 108), after which party Fogarty filed a miscellaneous motion (Paper No. 112) for leave to file, out of time, a preliminary motion 12 to attack the benefit accorded party Cragg of European Applications EP94400284.9 and EP94401306.9. The motion for leave as well as the preliminary motion 12 (Paper No. 113) were granted by a panel consisting of administrative patent judges Schafer and Lee (Paper No. 130).

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

The decision on Fogarty's preliminary motion 12 was adhered to on reconsideration (Paper No. 138) by a panel consisting of Senior Administrative Patent Judge McKelvey, and Administrative Patent Judges Schafer and Lee. This interference was re-declared in Paper No. 131 to change the junior/senior status of parties Cragg and Fogarty, with Cragg now being junior party.

Junior party Martin did not file a preliminary statement. It has indicated to the administrative patent judge to which this case was assigned that it did not want to participate in this interference except to "ride along" for the possibility that (1) the only interference-in-fact is determined to be between parties Cragg and Martin (a Cragg contention); and (2) that party Cragg will be deprived of its accorded benefit date (a Fogarty contention) and cannot demonstrate a sufficiently early date to prevail over Martin.

Because junior party Cragg filed no case-in-chief during the priority phase of this proceeding, it was placed under an order to show cause why judgment should not be entered against Cragg. Party Cragg requested final hearing for review of the Board's decision on Cragg's preliminary motions 1 and 2 and on Fogarty's preliminary motion 12. According to party Cragg it should not have been made a junior party and thus need not have had to put on a priority case in the first instance. Party Fogarty

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

requested review of the Board's decision on its preliminary motions 8 and 10. Oral argument was made on February 28, 2001, before administrative patent judges Schafer, Lee and Medley.

Findings of Fact

The below-listed findings as well as those contained in the discussion portion of this opinion are supported by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. This interference was declared on April 23, 1998, between three parties, Martin, Fogarty, and Goicoechea (now Cragg).
2. The involved patent of Martin is Patent No. 5,575,817, based on application 08/293,541, filed August 19, 1994.
3. The involved application of Cragg is application 08/461,402, filed June 5, 1995.
4. The involved application of Fogarty is application 08/463,836, filed June 5, 1995.
5. At the time of declaration of this interference, the named inventors of Cragg's involved application 08/461,402 were George Goicoechea, John Hudson, Claude Mialhe, Andrew H. Cragg, and Michael D. Dake.
6. Cragg's application 08/461,402, was also involved in a related interference, Interference No. 104,083, between parties Cragg and Martin but not Fogarty, wherein a motion to correct

Interference No. 104,192
Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

inventorship was granted, deleting George Goicoechea, John Hudson, and Claude Mialhe as co-inventors, and leaving only Andrew H. Cragg and Michael D. Dake.

7. This interference was re-declared on June 2, 1999 (Paper No. 106) to reflect that only Andrew H. Cragg and Michael D. Dake are named inventors in Cragg's involved application.

8. Independent claim 1 of Martin's involved patent reads identically as the count in related Interference No. 104,083, and judgment was entered against party Martin in that interference on March 10, 1999.

9. Claim 2 of Martin's involved patent depends from claim 1, and if re-written in independent form it would read the same as the count in this interference.

10. The count of this interference reads as follows (Paper No. 16):

An apparatus for reinforcing a bifurcated lumen comprising:

a first section, configured to be positioned within the lumen, comprising:

an upper limb, configured to fit within the lumen upstream of the bifurcation;

a first lower limb, configured to extend into a first leg of said bifurcation when said first section is positioned in the lumen, and

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

a second lower limb, shorter than said first lower limb, and configured so that when said first section is positioned in the lumen, said second lower limb does not extend into a second leg of said bifurcation,

and further comprising

a second section configured to be positioned separately within the lumen and joined to said second lower limb of the first section, effectively extending said second lower limb into said second leg of said bifurcation.

11. Cragg's preliminary statement identifies only Michael D. Dake as the inventor of the subject matter of the count.

12. After the rendering of the Board's decision on preliminary motions (Paper No. 108) and subsequent service of the preliminary statement of party Cragg, Cragg filed a miscellaneous motion to amend or correct its preliminary statement to identify Andrew H. Cragg and Michael D. Dake as co-inventors of the subject matter of the count. (Paper No. 117).

13. Cragg's motion to amend was denied. (Paper No. 130). A written opinion explaining the basis of that denial followed. (Paper No. 140). Cragg requested reconsideration. The original decision was adhered to on reconsideration. (Paper No. 146).

14. Cragg has not sought review of the Board's denial of Cragg's motion to amend or correct its preliminary statement to name both Andrew H. Cragg and Michael D. Dake as inventors.

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

15. Upon declaration of this interference, Cragg was accorded benefit of U.S. application 08/317,763, filed October 4, 1994, European application EP94400284.9, filed February 9, 1994, and European application EP94401306.9, filed June 10, 1994. The European applications did not identify any inventor and were filed by the entity MINTEC SARL.

16. Based on representations from individuals associated with party Cragg, party Fogarty regarded as true, until the service of party Cragg's preliminary statement, that European applications EP94400284.9 and EP94401306.9 were filed by MINTEC SARL on behalf of inventors Goicoechea, Hudson, Mialhe, and Cragg. (Fogarty Preliminary Motion 12, Fact No. 5 - not disputed by Cragg).

17. Michael D. Dake made an assignment of rights, including his interests in the invention covered by Cragg's involved application relating to a bifurcated stent-graft, to MinTec, Inc., for a one time payment of eight hundred thousand U.S. dollars (U.S. \$800,000) and other considerations, on May 6, 1996, with a stated effective date of April 30, 1996. (Cragg Exhibit 1025, CE-1025). The date of assignment was nearly two years and three months from the date of filing of EP94400284.9 on February 9, 1994, and nearly two years from the date of filing of EP94401306.9 on June 10, 1994.

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

18. Parties Cragg and Fogarty evidently treat, without dispute, that MinTec, Inc. and MINTEC SARL are related entities such that an assignment of interest to the former means the latter is an "assign."

19. Andrew H. Cragg made an assignment of rights, including his interests in the invention covered by Cragg's involved application relating to a bifurcated endoluminal prosthesis, to MINTEC, INC. on August 22, 1994. (Cragg Exhibit 1021, CE-1021). The date of assignment was six months after the date of filing of EP94400284.9 on February 9, 1994, and two months after the date of filing of EP94401306.9 on June 10, 1994.

Discussion

A. Fogarty's Preliminary Motion 12

In the "Relief Requested" portion of Fogarty's preliminary motion 12, it is stated:

Fogarty moves under 37 CFR § 1.633(g) to deny the senior party the benefit of EP94400284.9 and EP94401306.9 on the grounds that neither application was filed by (i) the individual now identified as the inventor or (ii) on his behalf by his legal representatives or assigns.

The statutory basis of Fogarty's preliminary motion 12 is 35 U.S.C. § 119, which states, in pertinent part:

Interference No. 104,192
Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

(a) An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the United States or to citizens of the United States, or in a WTO member country, shall have the same effect as the same application would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign country, if the application in this country is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such foreign application was filed; (Emphasis added.)

As the motion panel's decision on reconsideration (Paper No. 138) states on page 3, a statement with which we agree and adopt herein:

We interpret the above-quoted "any person who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have" language as meaning that the previously filed foreign application ~~must have been filed by the person or one who was,~~ at the time of filing of the previously filed foreign application, already a legal representative or assign of that person. This view is necessary to ensure a link between the presently involved application and the earlier filed foreign application with respect to the particular inventor. A contrary interpretation would cause entitlement to benefit to be negotiable as a commodity between unrelated entities. Note that if party Martin or party Fogarty now assigned its involved patent or application to MINTEC, that does not and should not mean party Martin or party Fogarty's involved case should suddenly be entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing dates of party Cragg's European applications, on the basis that the European applications were previously filed by MINTEC who is now the assignee of party Martin or party Fogarty's involved patent or application.

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

Our view is consistent with the opinion of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Vogel v. Jones, 486 F.2d 1068, 1072, 179 USPQ 425, 428 (CCPA 1973), wherein the court determined that a foreign application made by the assignee of a U.S. applicant, on behalf of one other than the United States inventor, is irrelevant to the rights of priority of the U.S. inventor. The Vogel case concerns 35 U.S.C. § 119, not 35 U.S.C. § 116 or § 120. Contrary to a suggestion by party Cragg in its reply brief at final hearing, Vogel has not been made outdated by statutory amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116 and § 120 in 1984. The inventive entity may not always be identical between a U.S. application as a whole and an ancestral corresponding application in a foreign application. E.g., Reitz v. Inoue, 39 USPQ2d 1838, 1840 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1996) ("the proposition that the inventive entity must be the same in both the foreign and the corresponding U.S. application in order to obtain benefit can no longer be accepted, if it ever was, as a hard and fast rule in view of the liberalization of the requirements for filing a U.S. application as joint inventors wrought by the 1984 amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 116."). But with regard to any particular invention at issue or involved in an interference, 35 U.S.C. § 119 still includes the language concerning filing in a foreign country by

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

assigns or legal representatives of the one who files for that invention in the United States.

We have reviewed Schmitt v. Babcock, 377 F.2d 994, 153 USPQ 719 (CCPA 1967), a case mentioned by Cragg during oral argument at final hearing as somehow being in support of its position, but it does not help Cragg's position. The Schmitt case, from a pre-1984 era, relates to an inconsistency or disagreement in inventorship between the U.S. application and the foreign application and a resolution of that disagreement prior to accordance of benefit. Here, inconsistency or disagreement in inventorship is not the issue. Nothing in Schmitt purports to not recognize the filing by assigns requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 119. Even if it does, that would be contrary to the Vogel case which is later in time and thus takes precedent over Schmitt.

It is not in dispute that the assignment from Michael D. Dake to Mintec, Inc. occurred subsequent to the filing of the two European applications. In its request for reconsideration (Paper No. 137) of the granting of Fogarty's preliminary motion 12, on pages 4-5, Cragg stated:

Mintec, the applicant in the EP applications in question, was the assignee of both Dr. Cragg and Dr. Dake, albeit the assignment by Dr. Cragg came several months after those applications had been filed and the assignment by Dr. Dake came more than a year after they had been filed.

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

Note Cragg's exhibit CE-1025, an assignment document from Mr. Michael D. Dake to MinTec, Inc., which was executed on May 6, 1996, more than two years after the filing of EP94400284.9, and nearly two years after the filing of EP94401306.9.

Cragg's brief at final hearing does not appear to argue that under 35 U.S.C. § 119, a subsequent assignment puts an assignee in the same position as if it were a "legal representative" or "assign" of the inventor at a previous time when a foreign application for the same invention was filed by that assignee. In any event, that argument, if made, would be rejected because it ignores plain statutory language to the contrary. Cragg has not set forth evidence of legislative history which clearly indicates that the statute does not mean what it plainly says.

Two new arguments have been raised for the first time by party Cragg in its reply brief at final hearing, which should have been raised, if at all, in its opposition to Fogarty's preliminary motion 12. The first new argument is this: That the two European applications were filed by MINTEC SARL for an invention "actually made" by Michael D. Dake and Andrew H. Cragg, regardless of assignment, and that this should satisfy the filing by assign or legal representative requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 119. The second new argument is raised by the last sentence on page 10 of Cragg's reply brief, which reads: "There is no requirement

Interference No. 104,192
Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

either in Section 119 or in case law that the assignment must have been perfected before the EP applications were filed in order to rely on those applications for priority purposes." The statement implies that somehow there was at least an obligation of assignment which only was not perfected or formalized until after the filing of the European applications, and that this should satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 119.

The two new arguments were not in Cragg's opposition to Fogarty's preliminary motion 12, and still not in Cragg's request for reconsideration of the motion panel's decision on Fogarty's preliminary motion 12. They further still do not appear to be contained in Cragg's principal brief at final hearing.⁴ These arguments do not involve mere statutory construction, but are also fact determinative. If the new arguments were timely raised in Cragg's opposition to Fogarty's preliminary motion 12,

⁴ In its principal brief at final hearing on page 24, Cragg states: "Michael Dake had assigned his invention to Mintec and his collaboration with Andrew Cragg on the claimed invention prior to the filing of the EP applications is acknowledged. CE1025-1." This cannot be reasonably construed as an argument that the European applications filed by MINTEC SARL were for an invention actually made by Michael D. Dake and that that would satisfy the filing by assigns requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 119. In any event, raising such an argument for the first time in the principal brief at final hearing would nonetheless be untimely. Exhibit CE1025 also does not speak of any "collaboration" in the sense of there being a common goal, but mere discussion, consultation, and communication between Michael D. Dake and one or more of Messrs. Goicoechea, Cragg, and Hudson on a topic and "whatever contributions Dr. Dake may have made" (Emphasis added).

Interference No. 104,192
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pertinent facts could have been presented by both parties and Fogarty would have had an opportunity to explore and possibly discredit Cragg's assertions. We decline to entertain new arguments which were not presented in Cragg's opposition to Fogarty's preliminary motion 12.

Accordingly, we address only those arguments of Cragg which were raised in its opposition to Fogarty's preliminary motion 12.

Cragg argues that Fogarty's preliminary motion 12 was based on the representation in Cragg's preliminary statement that Michael D. Dake was the inventor for the subject matter of the count, and yet applicable precedent indicates that preliminary statements can only be used as an effective admission of the earliest or limiting date of invention provable by the party. Cragg's argument overlooks the 1984 changes to 35 U.S.C. § 116 and a corresponding change to 37 CFR § 1.622 regarding the content of preliminary statements. Cragg's argument is rejected.

There are many precedents, including the one cited by Cragg, Dewey v. Lawton, 347 F.2d 629, 631, 146 USPQ 187, 188 (CCPA 1965), which set forth the law that the date alleged in a party's preliminary statement only constitutes a limiting date. Thus, although a party may prove a date of invention that is earlier or later than the alleged date, it cannot be entitled to a date that is prior to the alleged date. Those cases all focus on

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the assertion of a date of invention and are not concerned with any identification of inventorship in the preliminary statement. Identification of inventorship did not become a requirement for preliminary statements until an amendment was made to 37 CFR § 1.622 in 1984 when Title 35, United States Code, was amended to provide that not every named inventor has to have made a contribution to every claim in a patent application. In pertinent part, 35 U.S.C. § 116 now states:

§ 116 Inventors

When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as otherwise provided in this title. Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.

Thus, when an application is filed which names multiple inventors, it is not known which inventor(s) contributed to the subject matter of which claims, or to the count in an interference, even though that information may be relevant to the requirements for accordancy of benefit in an interference. Rule 1.622, as amended in 1984, partially addresses that problem by requiring in a preliminary statement identification of the inventors of the subject matter of the count. It reads, in pertinent part:

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(a) A party's preliminary statement must identify the inventor who made the invention defined by each count and must state on behalf of the inventor the facts required by paragraph (a) of §§ 1.623, 1.624, and 1.625 as may be appropriate. . . .

Thus, the established precedent focusing on the effect of assertions of invention dates and not concerned with identification of inventorship are not apposite.

Cragg argues:

Rule 629, entitled "Effect of preliminary statement," is the only rule that addresses the consequences for allegations made in a preliminary statement, such consequences being limited to dates and issues of proving priority. Importantly, Rule 629 was amended at the same time Rule 622 was amended (in 1984) to require identification of inventors in a preliminary statement, but the amendment did not create an admission as to inventorship. Rule 629(a) states:

A party shall be held to any date alleged in the preliminary statement. Doubts as to definiteness or sufficiency of any allegation in a preliminary statement . . . will be resolved against the party filing the statement by restricting the party to its effective date or the latest date of a period alleged in the preliminary statement.
(Emphasis in original).

But again, this rule focuses on the effect of assertions as to a date of invention. It is concerned with ambiguities or indefiniteness in the assertion of a date of invention, and is not concerned with anything about the naming of inventors. The rule gives notice of something not so plain and obvious, i.e., that if a range of dates is asserted, then the party making the

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assertion is limited to the latest of such dates. For instance, if a party asserts that its invention was made in a period from January through March of a certain year, then the earliest date of invention the party is entitled would be March 31st.

There need not be a rule to state that which is plainly so, e.g., that what a party represents to an administrative tribunal or an opposing party can be used against the party if the representation is relevant to an adjudication of the party's own rights or the rights between the parties. Party Cragg is not charged with a crime and is not being interrogated in a criminal investigation such that it must be "mirandized" -- warned that anything it says can and will be used against it in a court of law -- before it makes a usable statement. What is important is that party Cragg be given an opportunity to explain or correct any misstatement it might have made and which has been relied upon by either the tribunal or the opposing party. There was ample such opportunity in this case.

Concurrently with the filing of its opposition to Fogarty's preliminary motion 12, Cragg filed a motion under 37 CFR § 1.628 to amend or correct its preliminary statement, to name not just Michael D. Dake as the only inventor of the subject matter of the count, but Andrew H. Cragg and Michael D. Dake as co-inventors. That was a full opportunity for party Cragg to present all the

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evidence it wanted to present on the issue, to demonstrate that it had made an error in only naming Michael D. Dake as the inventor of the subject matter of the count. That motion was denied on April 7, 2000, in Paper No. 130. Party Cragg requested reconsideration of that decision. The original decision was adhered to in a reconsideration decision on June 27, 2000, in Paper No. 146. Party Cragg has not sought review of that decision at final hearing.

Party Cragg further argues that the outcome here is unfair because as the original senior party it need not have filed a preliminary statement, and if it did not file a preliminary statement, then none of this would have ensued. The argument is rejected. If Cragg had not filed a preliminary statement, it would not have revealed information which ultimately led to its being deprived of benefit to the earlier filing dates of foreign applications. But this result is not unfair if, as it is here, all pertinent information were known, Cragg would not be entitled, under the law, to those earlier filing dates. Cragg had ample opportunity to show that the information it had first given was a mistake but failed to make a successful showing.

When 35 U.S.C. § 116 was amended in 1984 to permit co-inventors to be jointly listed as inventors without all of them having contributed to each and every claim in an application, a

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corresponding change was made in 35 U.S.C. § 120 (relating to benefit to the earlier filing date of previously filed United States applications) to require not identity but merely an overlap of inventor(s) between the application seeking benefit and the earlier filed application. The change to 35 U.S.C. § 120 was necessary because additional or non-overlapping inventors may be present due to the inclusion of claims drawn to different subject matter. No such change was necessary, however, with respect to the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 119 that the person who has filed for a patent on an invention (here the invention of the count) must have previously regularly filed for a patent on the same invention in a foreign country, whether it is through legal representatives or assigns. Indeed, no change was made. The contexts and requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 119 and 35 U.S.C. § 120 are different. That Michael D. Dake being a sole inventor for the subject matter of the count is not a problem under 35 U.S.C. § 120 with respect to earlier filed United States applications does not mean Cragg can expect that it should also not be a problem insofar as benefit to foreign applications are concerned. Satisfaction of requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 120 entitles a party only to the earlier filing date of a previously filed United States application, not a foreign application.

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Alternatively, even assuming that Cragg's identification of Michael D. Dake as the only inventor for the subject matter of the count is a mistake and that Cragg has been allowed to amend its preliminary statement to identify both Andrew H. Cragg and Michael D. Dake as co-inventors of the subject matter of the count, that still does not help party Cragg in any meaningful way. Like Michael D. Dake, Andrew H. Cragg also did not assign his rights to MinTec, Inc. until after European application EP94400284.9 was filed on February 9, 1994, and European application EP94401306.9 was filed on June 10, 1994.

Cragg's Exhibit CE1021 is an assignment from Andrew Cragg, Claude Mialhe, George Goicoechea, and John Hudson to MINTEC, INC. It was executed by Andrew H. Cragg on August 22, 1994. Accordingly, MINTEC SARL was not an assign of either Michael D. Dake nor Andrew H. Cragg when it filed European applications EP94400284.9 and EP94401306.9. In that connection, we vacate the Board's previous finding in paragraph no. 7 of Paper No. 130 which stated: "The European applications EP94400284.9 and EP94401306.9 were filed by the assignee MINTEC SARL on behalf of inventors Andrew H. Cragg, George Goicoechea, John Hudson, and Claude Mialhe." That finding was made when the question of when Andrew H. Cragg assigned his rights was not an issue and also prior to party Cragg's representation to the Board in its request

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for reconsideration of the Board's granting of Fogarty's preliminary motion 12 that Andrew H. Cragg did not assign his rights to Mintec until several months after the European applications were filed. It lacks adequate basis in the record.⁵

Cragg still further argues that because it has been accorded benefit to the September 27, 1994 filing date of application 08/312,881 (granting of Cragg's preliminary motion 7) and because that application claims foreign priority to EP94400284.9 and EP94401306.9, which claim was granted by an examiner and not challenged in this interference, it still should have benefit of the filing dates of EP94400284.9 and EP94401306.9. The argument is without merit.

As the Board's decision on reconsideration (Paper No, 138) has stated on page 6:

Benefit to the two European applications cannot be obtained indirectly through the intermediate application 08/312,881, where the required overlap in inventor/filer is missing between the involved application and the European applications. This is not the same issue as satisfying the "filing within one year requirement of § 119" through an intermediary United States parent application.

⁵ Our authority and discretion to vacate the previous finding does not depend on whether Fogarty has asked the Board to reconsider the finding or when the request by Fogarty was made. We dismiss Cragg's argument that Fogarty was late in asking the Board to reconsider the previous finding.

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Cragg has offered no reason why the above-quoted analysis is erroneous. Here, we add the following observations.

Having benefit to the 9/27/94 filing date of application 08/312,881 means Cragg's involved application is deemed to have been filed not on the actual filing date of June 5, 1995, but on September 27, 1994. That brings Cragg's involved application much closer in time, by approximately 8 months, to any foreign application with respect to which it desires to be accorded benefit. With that shortening of the time gap, it is easier to satisfy the "within twelve months" time requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 119. It does not mean Cragg's involved application stands in the shoes or otherwise takes the place of the earlier filed domestic application. Benefit is still considered from the perspective of the claims or counts at issue in Cragg's involved application. Whether application 08/312,881 is entitled to benefit with respect to any claim contained therein is irrelevant, not at issue, and has not been determined in this proceeding. We are concerned with the claims of Cragg's involved application and the count in this interference. Fogarty is also correct in stating (Opp. Brief at 8):

Cragg's further argument on page 24 that 35 USC § 119 priority "has not been challenged" for Serial No. 08/312,881 also is irrelevant. In the context of an interference, rights under 35 USC § 119 and § 120 arise with respect to an embodiment within the count in a

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benefit application. Hunt v. Treppschuh, 523 F.2d 1386, 187 USPQ 426 (CCPA 1975). It is thus inaccurate to speak of priority between applications without reference to claims and/or a count. (Emphasis in original.)

For the foregoing reasons, Cragg has shown no error in the motion panel's granting of Fogarty's preliminary motion 12.

B. Fogarty's Preliminary Motions 8 and 10

In a decision mailed February 11, 2000 (Paper No. 108), the motions panel denied Fogarty's preliminary motion 8 under 37 CFR § 1.633(e)(1) which sought to declare another interference between proposed new claim 62 of an uninvolved application 08/684,508 of Fogarty and claim 89 of Cragg's involved application 08/461,402, and claim 1 of Martin's involved Patent No. 5,575,817. The decision gave two grounds for denying the preliminary motion:

(1) that the proposed new interference is barred by 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) because no claim which is the same or substantially the same as Martin's supposedly interfering patent claim 1 had been made by Fogarty within the critical one year period of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b); and

(2) that Fogarty failed to demonstrate that there is interference-in-fact between the allegedly interfering claims.

Fogarty argues, first, that we misapplied the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) and that if correctly applied, the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) are met. Fogarty further

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argues that there is no requirement in 37 CFR § 1.637 or otherwise, in connection with a preliminary motion to declare an additional interference, that the moving party has to demonstrate the existence of an interference-in-fact between the allegedly interfering claims.

1. Interference-In-Fact

According to Fogarty, it can find nothing in the interference rules which requires that in order for a preliminary motion to declare an additional interference to be granted, the preliminary motion must establish or demonstrate that an interference-in-fact exists between the claims sought to be involved in the additional interference. While there may be no express requirement, the decision on preliminary motions (Paper No. 108) on page 53, lines 18-22, states that the requirement is an implicit one:

Secondly, it is implicit that to demonstrate entitlement to the declaration of an additional interference as is requested in Fogarty's motion, Fogarty must demonstrate that there is interference-in-fact between Goicoechea's [Cragg after deleting Goicoechea as a co-inventor] application claim 89 and claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508. (Emphasis added.)

Party Fogarty's brief at final hearing does not explain why it is not an implicit requirement that a motion to have an

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interference declared must demonstrate that the claims said to interfere with each other actually interfere with each other, i.e., that there is interference-in-fact between the allegedly interfering claims. Moreover, the very first sentence of 37 CFR § 1.637(a) is this: "A party filing a motion has the burden of proof to show that it is entitled to the relief sought in the motion." (Emphasis added).

We decline to simply take a moving party's word that one of its claims interferes with one or more claims of other parties. We reiterate our holding in the decision on preliminary motions that it is an implicit requirement for a preliminary motion to have another interference declared that the motion must demonstrate that there is interference-in-fact between the allegedly interfering claims. Fogarty's brief at final hearing does not address the point of "implicit" requirement and thus has not shown that the motion panel was erroneous.

Fogarty also asserts that in any event the Board's two-way interference-in-fact analysis follows the Trial Section's precedential decision in Winter v. Fujita, 53 USPQ2d 1234 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1999), but that was not the criteria in October 1998 when preliminary motions were filed in this proceeding. We suppose that what Fogarty is arguing is that had it known of the two-way analysis requirement at the time it filed its preliminary

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motion 8, it could have tried to demonstrate satisfaction of the two-way requirement. That is true, but as was explained in our initial decision, Fogarty has failed to explain why there is interference-in-fact, in either direction, e.g., neither from Martin's claim 1 or Cragg's claim 89 to Fogarty's claim 62, nor from Fogarty's claim 62 to Martin's claim 1 or Cragg's claim 89.⁶ Note also that the declaration of an interference is a discretionary matter. See Ewing v. Fowler Car Co., 244 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1917) (explicitly rejecting the assertion of an applicant's right to declaration of an interference). It is not an abuse of discretion to not declare an interference where the moving party has not demonstrated that there is a conflict or interference-in-fact between opposing claims, regardless of whether the interference rules expressly require a demonstration of conflicting subject matter or interference-in-fact.

⁶ The motion panel's decision observed that Fogarty's position that Cragg's claim 89 and Martin's claim 1 are unpatentable over prior art while Fogarty's claim 62 is patentable over that same prior art is contrary to the position that Fogarty's claim 62 defines the same patentable invention as Cragg's claim 89 and Martin's claim 1. Fogarty's brief at final hearing points out that the motion panel rejected Fogarty's prior art argument and that Cragg has not sought review of that issue. But at best the circumstance pointed out by Cragg only eliminates an apparent inconsistency. It does not demonstrate affirmatively that the claims define the same patentable invention.

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2. 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) Bar

There is no dispute that Fogarty's amendment in its uninvolved application 08/684,508, proposing to add claim 62 to provoke an interference with claim 89 of Cragg's application 08/461,402 and claim 1 of Martin's Patent No. 5,575,817, is filed more than one year after the date of issuance of Martin's Patent No. 5,575,817. The question at issue is whether Fogarty had another claim, drawn to the same or substantially the same invention as Martin's claim 1, that was pending within one year subsequent to the date of issuance of the Martin patent. If so, claim 62 is not barred. If not, then claim 62 is barred.

In pertinent part, 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) states:

A claim which is the same as, or for the same or substantially the same subject matter as, a claim of an issued patent may not be made in any application unless such a claim is made prior to one year from the date on which the patent was granted.

Even though the new interference proposed by Fogarty involves claim 1 of Martin's patent, Fogarty attempted to demonstrate that it had a claim drawn to substantially the same subject matter as Martin's claim 1 by showing that it was claiming, within the critical one year period, the same invention as Martin's claim 2. Martin's claim 2 depends from claim 1 and in independent form represents the count of this interference.

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In the motion panel's initial decision (Paper No. 108, pages 52-53), it was stated:

There is no indication anywhere by any party that Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508 had a claim drawn to substantially the same subject matter as Martin's claim 2. While Fogarty's involved application [08/463,836] in this interference include claims which correspond to the count which is Martin's claim 2, that does not mean Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508 has at any time included a claim drawn to substantially the same subject matter as Martin's claim 2.

In its brief for final hearing, Fogarty argues that so long as it was claiming the required subject matter in some earlier application within one year of the issuance of the Martin patent, it passes muster under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b). Fogarty cites two decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, In re Schutte, 244 F.2d 323, 113 USPQ 537 (CCPA 1981) and Corbett v. Chisholm, 568 F.2d 759, 196 USPQ 337 (CCPA 1977), two decisions of the Board of Patent Interferences, Tezuka v. Wilson, 224 USPQ 1030, 1036 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1984), Olin v. Duerr, 175 USPQ 707 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1972), and one decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, Bowen v. Bihlmaier, 231 USPQ 662 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986), in support of its view. Fogarty points out that its uninvolved application 08/684,508 is a file wrapper continuation of application 08/255,681, to which it has been

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accorded benefit in this interference and with respect to which Fogarty's involved application is a divisional application.

Cragg's opposition brief does not take up and address the issue as noted above. We find Fogarty's presentation persuasive at least in the circumstances of this case. Consequently, we no longer rely on the above-quoted portion of the motion panel's decision to deny Fogarty's preliminary motion 8.

Another issue, however, nonetheless undermines and precludes the granting of Fogarty's preliminary motion 8. As was explained in the motion panel's decision on page 53:

[W]e disagree with Fogarty's contention that if a claim the same as Martin's claim 2 is made in an application, then a claim the same as Martin's claim 1 is also necessarily made, simply because Martin's claim 2 depends from Martin's claim 1 and thus includes all features of Martin's claim 1. The case cited by Fogarty, In re Schutte, 244 F.2d 323, 113 USPQ 537 (CCPA 1981), does not hold that so long as every feature of a claim is present in another claim then substantially the same subject matter is being claimed. In Schutte, no other difference between two claims is at issue, except for the one which the Court regarded as different in language but same in substance.

Fogarty's view leads to the erroneous result that a claim directed to patentably distinct and separately patentable subject matter as that of another claim can be regarded, at the same time, as claiming the same or substantially the same invention as that other claim. Party Cragg should note that Martin's claim 2 can be separately patentable and patentably distinct from

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Martin's claim 1 even though it depends from claim 1 and undoubtedly includes every limitation of claim 1.

Because it is important that we fully address Fogarty's arguments, we reproduce portions of Fogarty's brief below (Br. at 7-8):

Fogarty responded to Cragg's assertion of noncompliance with 35 USC § 135(b) by noting that the determination under the statute is:

[W]hether the claim which was pending had all the material limitations of the patent claim. *In re Schutte*, 244 F.2d 323, 113 USPQ 537 (CCPA 1981). If the pending claims had all the material limitations there is compliance with the statute even if different language is employed. [Fogarty Reply, p. 5, original italics]

This principle of law has been applied for at least half a century, as is apparent from the authorities cited in the last two paragraphs on page 5 of Fogarty's Reply, i.e., *Ex parte Bowen*, 80 USPQ 106 (Bd. App. 1947), *Stalego v. Heymes*, *supra*, *Olin v. Duerr*, *supra*, and *In re Schutte*, *supra*.

The decision adopted Cragg's argument but with one possible exception did not address (nor acknowledge) the precedents cited by Fogarty.

The test in each of *Bowen*, *Stalego*, *Olin* and *Schutte* for determining compliance with 35 USC § 135(b) is straight forward: is a limitation of the patent claim material and if so, is it claimed by the applicant, expressly or inherently? [Footnote omitted] Application of this test to different fact patterns is seen in a comparison of the results in, for example, (i) *Corbett v. Chisholm*, *supra*, where there was no compliance because a limitation was material but was neither disclosed nor inherent, (ii) *Bowen v.*

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Bihlmaier, *supra* where compliance was found because the material limitation was substantially claimed albeit in different language, (iii) *Connin v. Andrews*, 223 USPQ 243 (Bd. Pat. Int'f. 1984) where the limitation, while material and undisclosed, was inherent, and (iv) *Pizzurro v. Pfund*, 1 USPQ2d 1056 (Bd. Pat. Int'f. 1984) where a limitation was material and claimed.

In our view, none of the authorities Fogarty cites sets forth the principle that so long as every material limitation of a patent claim is included in an applicant's claim, then the applicant has claimed substantially the same invention as the patent claim, regardless of whether the applicant's claim includes additional features which may render the applicant's claim patentably distinct or separately patentable from the patent claim.

Except for *In re Tanke*, 213 F.2d 551, 102 USPQ 83 (CCPA 1954), *Stalego v. Heymes*, 263 F.2d 334, 120 USPQ 473 (CCPA 1959), *Wetmore v. Miller*, 477 F.2d 960, 177 USPQ 699 (CCPA 1973), and *Corbett v. Chisholm*, 568 F.2d 759, 196 USPQ 337 (CCPA 1977), none of the other cases cited by Fogarty⁷ for determining whether substantially the same invention was being claimed by an

⁷ Not *Rieser v. Williams*, 255 F.2d 419, 118 USPQ 96 (CCPA 1958); not *In re Schutte*, 244 F.2d 323, 113 USPQ 537 (CCPA 1981); not *Ex parte Bowen*, 80 USPQ 106 (Bd. App. 1947); not *Olin v. Duerr*, 175 USPQ 707 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1972); not *Connin v. Andrews*, 223 USPQ 243 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1984); not *Pizzurro v. Pfund*, 1 USPQ2d 1056 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1984); not *Bowen v. Bihlmaier*, 231 USPQ 662 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986).

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applicant discussed as an issue whether the applicant's claim contained additional features which made the application claim not substantially the same as the patent claim. Fogarty too strictly applied the principle that if every material feature of the patent claim is present in the application claim then substantially the same invention is being claimed by the applicant. The mistake lies in not recognizing that the applicant's claim may include material features that render the applicant's claim patentably distinct and separately patentable from the patent claim.

In Stalego v. Heymes, 263 F.2d 334, 335, 120 USPQ 473, 475 (CCPA 1959), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated:

Those decisions [citing to precedents] hold, in effect, that claims are not for substantially the same subject matter if one of them contains one or more material limitations which are not found in the other. Accordingly, the ultimate question to be decided in such cases is generally whether specific differences between claims are material; and that is a question which must be decided largely on the basis of the particular circumstances of each case.

In Stalego, the Court reviewed the additional features of the reissue applicant's claim and stated that it did not regard any of those limitations as important. In analyzing the additional features claimed by the reissue applicant, the Court in Stalego, 263 F.2d at 338, 120 USPQ at 477, referred to one feature as not having criticality and another as adding nothing of consequence.

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The key is that the limitations of the applicant's claim at issue must be examined and are relevant too for materiality, not just the features of the patent claim. In Wetmore v. Miller, 477 F.2d 960, 177 USPQ 699, 701 (CCPA 1973), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cited to Rieser v. Williams, 255 F.2d 419, 118 USPQ 96 (1958) and Stalego v. Heymes, 263 F.2d 334, 120 USPQ 473 (1959), as setting forth the criterion that has been adopted by the CCPA for determining the applicability of section 135(b).

We do not regard Wetmore v. Miller as making any change to the criterion set forth in Stalego v. Heymes. Evidently, neither does Fogarty. In Wetmore, in light of the additional "fusible" limitation contained in the applicant's claim, the Court stated that the Board made too much emphasis on the fact that the patent claim applies to multiple embodiments and gave insufficient weight to embodiments in the patent using a heat fusible member. Note that the patent claim utilized means-plus-function features under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Clearly, the Court considered the technical significance of features in the applicant's claim in a comparison with the claim of the patentee.

In Corbett v. Chisholm, supra, and as Fogarty itself has noted, (Reply at 6, lines 19-25), in response to a restriction requirement the applicant elected to prosecute apparatus claims instead of method claims as the patentee had claimed and the

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patentee's method could be practiced with apparatus materially different from that which the applicant elected. On that basis, the Court held that the applicant's claim and the patentee's claim defined patentably distinct inventions. Thus, the applicant was not claiming substantially the same invention as the patentee. What this suggests is that the features claimed by the applicant, over and above that which is claimed by the patentee, are important and cannot be ignored.⁸

As for In re Tanke, 213 F.2d 551, 102 USPQ 83 (CCPA 1954), it does not hold, as Fogarty argues on page 8 of its reply, that "a mere distinction in breadth or scope" does not define a separate invention. The language of In re Tanke must be read in context. What it actually conveys is that where the subject matter of the differently claimed inventions has already been determined as being directed to substantially the same invention, the specific variations are a mere distinction in breadth or scope within the same or substantially the same subject matter and thus do not define separate inventions or inventions which are not substantially the same. Note that In re Tanke states, 213 F.2d at 555, 102 USPQ at 85:

⁸ Note also that other claims of the applicant did not include one or more material features of the patentee's claim.

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Furthermore, it should be noted that the terms "draft structure" defined by appellants' original claims 6 and 14, and the terms such as "drawbar-receiving member" and "bail-receiving member" in the appealed claims seem to be merely different expressions for essentially the same apparatus both structurally and functionally.

The final conclusion of the board in this case holding that the recitation of the draft structure in the appealed claims "to be different in scope from that recited in claim 14" does not appear to legally establish that such claims are not for substantially the same subject matter.

In dealing with competing claims, one group of which was drawn to a spring which assisted in both lifting and lowering certain plow beams therein defined, and another group which merely defined the function of the spring as assisting in the lifting of said beams, the Supreme Court held that both groups of claims were for the same combination; . . . and that such [one group of] claims should they consist of nothing more than a mere distinction in breadth or scope when compared to the [other group of] patented claims, do not define a separate invention or subject matter which is not substantially the same. Miller v. Eagle Manufacturing Co., 151 U.S. 186 [citations omitted]. (Emphasis added.)

Fogarty's claim 27, the same as original claim 27 in Fogarty's parent application 08/255,681 filed on June 8, 1994, was made within the one-year of November 19, 1996, the date of issuance of Martin's Patent No. 5,575,817. Even assuming that claim 27 includes every feature of Martin's dependent claim 2, and therefor it must include every feature of Martin's independent claim 1, that does not mean Fogarty had claimed substantially the same invention as Martin's claim 1. Martin's

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independent claim 1 formed the basis of the count in related Interference No. 104,083. Martin's dependent claim 2 forms the basis of the count in this interference (See Paper No. 16).

Martin's claim 2 adds a feature which is not present in Martin's claim 1. Fogarty had notice that the examiner regarded Martin's claim 2 as patentably distinct from Martin's claim 1. On page 3 of the examiner's Rule 1.609(b) submission, it is stated:

Distinction between Counts 1 and 2.

The important feature of count 1 [the count in Interference 104,083] is that the bifurcated prosthesis has two limbs but only one limb extends across the bifurcation and into the lumen of the vessel. Count 2 [the count in this interference] requires an additional stent to be added to the short limb, thus making a two piece graft that extends into both branches of the vessel. The count 2 is patentably distinct from count 1 for this reason.

Moreover, on page 9 of Fogarty's preliminary motion 8, Fogarty expressly recognized that the USPTO has regarded the counts of Interference No. 104,083 and this interference, represented by Martin's claims 1 and 2, as being directed to separately patentable inventions. Fogarty did not challenge that position. Instead, Fogarty stated that "[t]he same would apply to the Count of the present interference and proposed Count F-2 [for the additional interference]."

In summary, according to Fogarty, because its claim 27 was pending within the critical one-year period of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)

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and because claim 27 includes every feature of Martin's dependent claim 2, and therefore Martin's independent claim 1, Fogarty was claiming substantially the same invention as Martin's claim 1 within the critical one-year period of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b). We reject Fogarty's argument, because it regards as irrelevant whether the additional feature added by Martin's dependent claim 2 renders Martin's claim 2 patentably distinct and separately patentable from Martin's claim 1. If it is, as it apparently is so based on the examiner's Rule 1.609(b) submission, a position Fogarty has not disputed and in fact urged as similarly true with the count in this interference as compared to the proposed count (see Fogarty's preliminary motion 8, Section 7 on page 9), then Fogarty cannot be deemed as claiming substantially the same invention as Martin's claim 1 by way of having a claim the same as Martin's claim 2.⁹ Fogarty has failed to demonstrate that it had been claiming substantially the same invention as Martin's claim 1 within the one-year period of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b).

3. Cragg's Assertion that claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs

⁹ This is in contrast with the applicant's claiming the same patentable invention as the patentee but merely adds features which are of no criticality or significance. See Stalego v. Heymes, 263 F.2d at 338, 120 USPQ at 477.

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In opposing Fogarty's preliminary motion 8, Cragg never asserted that any claim of Fogarty was unpatentable for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. The brief for final hearing is not an occasion to be raising such issues for the first time. Accordingly, we decline to entertain Cragg's argument that claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.

The motion panel's decision on preliminary motions (Paper No. 108) stated that it was manifestly apparent based on the entirety of the pleadings that claim 62 and not claim 63 of Fogarty's uninvolved application was the claim at issue in connection with Fogarty's motion to have an additional interference declared. It further found that parties Cragg and Martin would not be prejudiced by a recognition that Fogarty's motion concerned claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application. While opposing Fogarty's motion, Cragg asserted that Fogarty's claims 62 and 63 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, but meaningfully discussed only the features of Fogarty's claim 63. Because nothing meaningful was presented with regard to Fogarty's claim 62, the decision on preliminary motions did not discuss Cragg's mere conclusion that Fogarty's claim 62 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

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In its opposition brief at final hearing, Cragg asserts that claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, and makes a detailed analysis, for the first time, as to why the assertion has merit. This substantive analysis directed to Fogarty's claim 62 was not previously provided in Cragg's opposition to Fogarty's preliminary motion 8. Accordingly, such analysis will not be entertained for the first time at final hearing.

We will not compare Fogarty's claims 62 and 63 and attempt to figure out which features are common therebetween such that when Cragg discussed a certain feature of claim 63 when opposing Fogarty's preliminary motion 8 it was the same as if it were discussing a corresponding feature in Fogarty's claim 62. It was incumbent upon Cragg when opposing Fogarty's motion to clearly set forth why Fogarty's claim 62 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. It is not the role of the Board to act as an advocate for either party by making arguments, presentations, or comparisons which should have been made by the parties themselves.

Because no meaningful argument was presented by Cragg in its opposition to Fogarty's preliminary motion 8 as to why claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, we reject Cragg's

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argument at final hearing that claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

Alternatively, even if we do consider the substantive arguments made for the first time by Cragg in its opposition brief at final hearing concerning claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508, the arguments are without merit and do not make out a prima facie case that claim 62 of Fogarty's application 08/684,508 is without written description support in the specification.

According to Cragg, the features (1) a first leg joined to said anchor section, and (2) means for joining a second leg to said anchor section, of claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508 are without support in the specification of application 08/684,508. Cragg contends that "Fogarty's first leg is never joined to an anchor section." Cragg explains that Fogarty's first leg is positioned within a fiber fabric liner at a location spaced below the anchor section. According to Cragg, Fogarty's second leg is also not joined to the anchor section, evidently for the same reason, and thus there can be no description for a "means for joining a second leg to said anchor section." Cragg's arguments assume that there must be direct contact between the first leg and the anchor section and between

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the second leg and the anchor section. We see no reason, however, to construe claim 62 of Fogarty's uninvolved application 08/684,508 so narrowly as to require direct or immediate contact between the first and second legs and the anchor section.

Cragg does not contend that Fogarty's application 08/684,508 sets forth a special definition for the word "join" that is different from the ordinary meaning of the term. We understand the word "join" as sufficiently broad to encompass an indirect connection through an intermediate member. See, for example, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, Copyright © 1999, which defines "join" as follows:

1 a: to put or bring together so as to form a unit . . .
... b: to connect (as points) by a line c: ADJOIN 2:
to put or bring into close association or relationship
... 3: to engage in (battle) 4 a: to come into the
company of ... b: to associate oneself with ...

If the first and second legs in Fogarty's application 08/684,508 are connected to the anchor section by way of a fiber fabric liner, as Cragg apparently indicates, that does not mean the first and the second legs are not joined to the anchor section. Cragg argues that the tubular liner means cannot also be the means for joining because if it is then that would render meaningless the tubular liner means element of claim 62. The argument is without merit, because the recitation of a tubular liner means in claim 62 further specifies that the liner

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structure defines a continuous flow path from the anchor section to the first leg and an opening disposed toward the second branch lumen. We note further that nothing precludes the same disclosed physical element from being the corresponding structure of two or more means-plus-function elements in a claim, provided that the structure performs the recited functions of those means-plus-function clauses.

4. Fogarty's argument that notwithstanding any 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) bar relative to patentee Martin, Fogarty is not precluded from having an interference with Cragg is without merit

Fogarty points out that in related Interference No. 104,083 involving only Martin and Cragg, specifically Cragg claim 89 and Martin claim 1, judgment has been entered against patentee Martin and thus claim 1 of Martin is as good as cancelled. According to Fogarty, the time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) is for protecting patentees from perpetually under threat of an interference proceeding initiated by applicants. Thus, Fogarty argues that because judgment has been entered against Martin's patent claim 1 in Interference No. 104,083, protection for Martin under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) insofar as Martin's claim 1 is concerned is moot and unnecessary. Fogarty's view is that in this circumstance, application of the bar under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) only protects another applicant, i.e., party Cragg, whose claim 89 would be shielded from a priority determination relative to Fogarty.

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While 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) was primarily enacted to protect patentees, the language of the statute is not such that only a patentee may benefit from the bar. The statutory section is written in terms of a bar on the presentation of a claim, not as a bar on having an interference with a patentee. If an applicant is time-barred by 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) from presenting a certain claim, then it follows that the barred claim cannot serve as the basis of an interference with respect to another applicant whose claim for the same patentable invention is not subject to the bar. Thus, if applicable, the bar under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) yields an incidental benefit to potentially opposing applicants. The statutory section does not restrict or limit who may benefit from application of the bar, as it only precludes the presentation of a claim. Note that 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) has been upheld as an applicable ground of rejection in ex parte prosecution before the USPTO. In re McGrew, 120 F.3d 1236, 43 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Fogarty would have us read into 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) language that is not there, to turn it into a bar against having certain types of interferences instead of simply a bar on the presentation of certain claims as it so plainly reads. We decline to so distort or add to the statutory language. In our

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view, if Fogarty cannot present a claim, then it cannot have an interference based on that claim with another party, whether that other party is an applicant or a patentee.

Fogarty's claim 62 was presumed by the parties as being for substantially the same invention as Martin's patent claim 1. Because it was presented outside of the one year period from the date of issuance of the Martin patent, and because Fogarty can demonstrate no other claim which was pending prior to the one year period and which was directed to substantially the same invention as Martin's claim 1, Fogarty's claim 62 is barred.

The fact that Martin's patent claim 1 has been determined unpatentable to Martin because of an adverse judgment in Interference No. 104,083 does not help Fogarty. The language of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) refers to a claim for the same or substantially the same subject matter as "a claim of an issued patent" and does not purport to add the qualifications that such a claim must remain valid, non-canceled, patentable, non-disclaimed, and/or enforceable. We decline to read into 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) these conditions in the absence of a showing by Fogarty of a clear legislative intent to that effect. The operative word is "issued," similar to the word "born." Just as a baby cannot be un-born, an issued claim cannot become non-issued whatever its status becomes subsequent to issuance.

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The public's interest is not harmed by applying 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) the way it is written and enacted by Congress. Fogarty is also under a mistaken belief that it is prejudiced by its not being successful with preliminary motion 8 to get into an interference with Cragg who has a dominating claim. Fogarty's predicament arises from its not having established, in connection with a proposed new interference involving Cragg's claim 89, interference-in-fact with respect to a Fogarty claim that is not time barred under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b). Alternatively, if Fogarty believes that Cragg's dominating claim 89 and any Fogarty claim involved in this interference define the same patentable subject matter, Fogarty could have moved to broaden out the count in this interference to the scope of Cragg's claim 89 and to have Cragg's claim 89 designated as corresponding to the revised new count. Fogarty did not take such action in this case. On these circumstances, that Cragg has a dominating claim not involved in this interference or a new interference with Fogarty does not mean Fogarty has been subjected to prejudice. A dominating claim is not necessarily a claim drawn to the same patentable invention as a dominated claim. In either case, however, with regard to Cragg's allegedly dominating claim 89 Fogarty has shown no prejudice by the denial of its preliminary motion 8.

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5. Fogarty's preliminary motion 10

Fogarty's preliminary motion 10 sought to be accorded benefit of the earlier filing date of application 08/255,681, with respect to the count proposed in connection with Fogarty's preliminary motion 8. Consequently, preliminary motion 10 is contingent upon the granting of preliminary motion 8. Because Fogarty's preliminary motion 8 was properly denied, Fogarty's preliminary motion 10 was correctly dismissed as moot.

6. Cragg's Motion to Suppress

Cragg has filed a motion to suppress five exhibits FE-3001, FE-3002, FE-3004, FE-3005, and CE-1019. These are exhibits identified by party Fogarty, prior to submission of its brief at final hearing, as those which Fogarty intended to rely upon at final hearing in connection with its seeking review of the motion panel's decision of Fogarty's preliminary motion 8. According to Cragg, Fogarty may not rely on these exhibits at final hearing because Fogarty did not rely on these exhibits when filing its preliminary motion 8.

Cragg has not pointed out, and it is not immediately apparent, where in Fogarty's briefs at final hearing are references made to exhibits FE-3001, FE-3002, FE-3004, FE-3005, and CE-1019, or how the substance of these exhibits have been relied upon by Fogarty in meaningful furtherance of any argument.

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Thus, with regard to these exhibits, Cragg has failed to make out a prima facie case of why the motion to suppress should be granted. Alternatively, even without suppressing these exhibits, Fogarty's arguments concerning its preliminary motions 8 and 10 have not been shown to have merit. Accordingly, Cragg's motion to suppress is denied and alternatively dismissed as moot.

C. Cragg's Preliminary Motion 1

In Cragg's preliminary motion 1, it is alleged that Fogarty's claims 41-69, not all of Fogarty's claims corresponding to the count, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for lack of written description in the specification. Fogarty's claims 42-69 depend either directly or indirectly from claim 41. Cragg's preliminary motion 1 (Paper No. 39, pp. 6-7) specifically identified the following feature of Fogarty's method claim 41 as that which is without written description:

[I]ntroducing into a patient's vasculature an anchor section and first tubular graft of the vascular graft so that the anchor section is disposed within the primary artery and the first tubular graft is disposed within the first branch artery to form a first continuous flow path from the primary artery to the first branch artery.

According to Cragg's preliminary motion 1, the above-quoted feature of Fogarty's method claim 41 requires the anchor section and the first tubular graft to be introduced in a single step, not sequentially as is disclosed in Fogarty's specification. We

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reproduce the following paragraph from page 10 of Cragg's preliminary motion 1, which clearly reveals Cragg's position:

The Fogarty Application fails to suggest introducing an anchor section and first tubular graft in a single step. Instead, the Fogarty Application teaches (1) first introducing the bifurcated base structure so that the anchor section is positioned within a primary vessel; (2) *after the bifurcated base structure is anchored*, the first tubular graft is introduced into the first connector leg and anchored between the leg and the first branch artery; and (3) the second tubular graft is then inserted into the second connector section and anchored between the described second connector and the second branch artery. See Fogarty Application at Page 6, lines 1-9. (Emphasis in original).

The decision on preliminary motions rejected Cragg's argument, stating (Paper No. 108, p. 10):

We reject Goicoechea's [Cragg's] argument because we do not read or interpret the above-quoted language of claim 41 as requiring that the anchor section and the first tubular graft be introduced "in a single step" or simultaneously. The words "in a single step" do not appear in claim 41, nor do the words "simultaneously," "concurrently," "unison," or any other term which means the same. The language is simply broadly recited and imposes no particular order for the insertion of the anchor section and the first tubular graft.

In its principal brief at final hearing, Cragg does not continue to argue that Fogarty's claim 41 requires that the anchor section and the first tubular graft be introduced in a single step or simultaneously. Rather, a new argument is made through the back door that the claim is so broad that the full

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scope of what is claimed is not described in the specification. Specifically, on page 20 of its brief, in a section entitled "CRAGG MOTION 1 SHOULD BE GRANTED," Cragg states:

If the Board adheres to its broad construction of claim 41 [that no specific sequence of introduction is required], then the Fogarty specification lacks written description for claim 41 because as discussed it only describes the sequential introduction of the anchor section and the first tubular graft but not the introduction of the anchor section and first tubular graft as a unitary structure. There is nothing in the Fogarty application to convey to those skilled in the art that Fogarty was in possession of that aspect of the invention of claim 41, if claim 41 is broadly construed as proposed.

We have again reviewed Cragg's preliminary motion 1 (Paper No. 39). Nothing therein can reasonably be considered as an alternative or contingent argument that if the Board is not persuaded by Cragg's primary argument that Fogarty's claim 41 requires the introduction of the anchor section and the first tubular graft in a single step then the claim is nonetheless not described in the specification because of undue breadth. In the case of Cragg's preliminary motion 1, the one argument actually made is the only argument made. Consequently, the issue now raised by Cragg at final hearing was neither developed and briefed by the parties during the preliminary motions stage of this interference, nor considered by the motions panel when preliminary motions were decided.

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In short, Cragg wants the board to now hold Fogarty's claims 41-69 as being without written description in the specification for a reason other than that articulated and set forth by Cragg in its preliminary motion 1. We decline to consider this new argument at the final hearing stage of the proceeding. Final hearing under the interference rules is not a place to begin preliminary motions afresh. Rather, we are here to review the decision by a three-member motions panel on preliminary motions made by the parties, on the evidence and arguments which formed the basis of the decision on preliminary motions.

A new reason for granting a motion should not be considered at final hearing if it was not included in the original motion and not supported by a showing of good cause why the argument was not earlier presented. Fredkin v. Irasek, 397 F.2d 342, 346, 158 USPQ 280, 284 (CCPA 1968); Koch v. Lieber, 141 F.2d 518, 520, 61 USPQ 127, 129 (CCPA 1944); Bayles v. Elbe, 16 USPQ2d 1389, 1391 (Bd. Pat. & Int. 1990) ("It has been a longstanding practice that a party whose motion was denied cannot present at final hearing grounds not included in the original motion."). It is inappropriate for a party to present arguments in its brief which were not a part of the motion or opposition. Lawson v. Enloe, 26 USPQ2d 1594 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1992).

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All reasons for granting a party's desired relief should be advanced in the party's motion. A piecemeal presentation in which a party may start over with new arguments after an adverse decision has been rendered would make an orderly proceeding next to impossible to conduct. Cragg's brief offered no excuse for raising the issue of undue breadth issue so late, more than two years after the filing of Cragg's preliminary motion 1 on October 16, 1998, and ten months after the decision on preliminary motions has been rendered.

Cragg cannot credibly assert that it had no idea that Fogarty's claim 41 can possibly be construed so as to not require the introduction of the anchor section and the first tubular graft in a single step or simultaneously. As the moving party, Cragg was attempting to persuade the Board to adopt a narrow interpretation of Fogarty's claim 41, i.e., that the claim required the introduction of the anchor section and the first tubular graft in a single step or simultaneously. The mere filing of Cragg's motion reflects an awareness that the claim may not be so construed. Cragg was very much on notice that the Board may not adopt the narrow interpretation urged by Cragg. Cragg may not credibly claim to have been blind-sided by the Board's not adopting its position.

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An interference is an inter partes proceeding. The Board may not suitably act as an advocate for either party, either to fill in gaps left open in either party's presentation, or to offer an alternate rationale and to try to fit the facts to that rationale, all on its own, particularly when the considerations are complex and the parties may well differ in their views. In presenting a preliminary motion for judgment, a party may not simply plead a statutory section, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, and then rely on the Board to propose different ways in which the opponent's claims may possibly be attacked as being without written description in the specification. With regard to Cragg's preliminary motion 1, our decision on preliminary motions addressed the arguments made by Cragg. The new argument now presented by Cragg is not entitled to consideration.

For the foregoing reasons, the motions panel properly denied Cragg's preliminary motion 1.

D. Cragg's Preliminary Motion 2

We adopt in its entirety the discussion in our decision on preliminary motions (Paper No. 108), which is reproduced below, and then add a few more comments to address Cragg's brief at final hearing:

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By this motion, Goicoechea [Cragg] alleges that there is no interference-in-fact between its involved application 08/461,402 and Fogarty's involved application 08/463,836. As is stated in 37 CFR § 1.601(j):

An interference-in-fact exists when at least one claim of a party that is designated to correspond to a count and at least one claim of an opponent that is designated to correspond to the count define the same patentable invention.

In that regard, 37 CFR § 1.601(n) states:

Invention "A" is the same patentable invention as an invention "B" when invention "A" is the same as (35 U.S.C. 102) or is obvious (35 U.S.C. 103) in view of invention "B" assuming invention "B" is prior art with respect to invention "A". Invention "A" is a separate patentable invention with respect to invention "B" when invention "A" is new (35 U.S.C. 102) and non-obvious (35 U.S.C. 103) in view of invention "B" assuming invention "B" is prior art with respect to invention "A". (Emphasis in original.)

Resolution of an interference-in-fact issue involves a two-way patentability analysis. For there to be an interference-in-fact, the parties must each have at least one claim which collectively satisfy the following: The claimed invention of Party A must anticipate or render obvious the claimed invention of Party B and the claimed invention of Party B must

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anticipate or render obvious the claimed invention of Party A.

For a showing of no-interference-in-fact, the burden is on Goicoechea as the movant, see, e.g., 37 CFR § 1.637(a), to demonstrate that all of Goicoechea's claims 55, 59, 62-65, 88 and 90 which correspond to the count do not define the same patentable invention as any one of Fogarty's claims 27-69, or that all of Fogarty's claims 21-69 do not define the same patentable invention as any one of Goicoechea's claims 55, 59, 62-65, 88 and 90. Goicoechea has attempted to show that all of its claims 55, 59, 62-65, 88 and 90 define an invention process which is neither anticipated nor obvious over any one of Fogarty's claims 27-69.

Goicoechea argues that all of its claims include a "long-leg, short-leg" concept which is absent from and not suggested by any one of Fogarty's claims corresponding to the count. Also, apparently referring to the count, the motion on page 10 explains the subject matter "supposedly" in conflict as follows:

The invention that is the subject of this Interference relates to a two-section apparatus comprising (1) a first section configured to be positioned within a

bifurcated lumen and (2) a second section configured to be positioned separately in a branch of the bifurcated lumen and to extend into the bifurcated lumen. A first lower limb of the first section is configured so that it extends into a first leg of the bifurcation when the first section is positioned in the lumen. A second lower limb of the first section, which is shorter than the first lower limb, is configured so that it does not extend into a second leg of the bifurcation. Accordingly, the first section defines a "long-leg, short-leg" concept. Joining two components (the first and second sections) completes the apparatus. (Emphasis in original).

Of all Goicoechea claims which correspond to the count, claims 55, 59 and 90 are independent claims. Claim 90 is identical to the count. Claim 55 embodies the "long-leg, short-leg" idea by including step (a) -- disposing said proximal portion of said bifurcated prosthesis in said blood vessel such that said first distal portion of said bifurcated prosthesis extends into said first branched vessel [long-leg], and step (c) -- attaching said second prosthesis to said extension portion of said bifurcated prosthesis such that said second prosthesis extends into said second branched vessel [short-leg]. But claim 59 is broad and does not do the same. In that regard, claim 59 is reproduced below:

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59. A bifurcated prosthesis for use with an aneological bifurcation of a blood vessel into two branched vessels comprising a bifurcated proximal portion adapted to be disposed within said blood vessel, a distal portion adapted to extend across the bifurcation into one of the branched vessels, and a separate distal segment joined to said proximal portion and adapted to allow blood to flow from the proximal portion into the other branched vessel.

Goicoechea has not shown that claim 59 requires that whenever the proximal portion is placed within the blood vessel, the first distal portion is already attached to the proximal portion and extending from the blood vessel into a branched vessel and the second distal segment is not yet joined to the proximal portion. Indeed, claim 59 is broad enough to cover the case of two short-legs, i.e., the proximal portion is introduced into the blood vessel first, and then the first distal portion and the second distal segment are introduced in sequence, each extending into a respective branched blood vessel.

For the foregoing reasons, the patentable distinction argued by Goicoechea does not exist with respect to at least Goicoechea's independent claim 59. That alone is sufficient ground to reject Goicoechea's motion for no interference-in-fact. Additionally, with

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respect to Fogarty's claims 41-69, Goicoechea is improperly reading into those claims a specific embodiment from Fogarty's disclosure rather than focusing on the language of the claims themselves. As we discussed in the context of Goicoechea's preliminary motion 1, Fogarty's independent claim 41 is broadly recited and imposes no particular manner for the insertion of the anchor section and the first tabular graft.

Given Fogarty's claim 41, it is left to the discretion of one with ordinary skill in the art just how to introduce the anchor section and the first tubular graft. One with ordinary skill in the art possesses a certain basic level of skill. See, e.g., In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743, 226 USPQ 771, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ([Applicant's] argument presumes stupidity rather than skill). A conclusion of obviousness also may be made based on the common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference. In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 163 USPQ 545, 549 (CCPA 1969). It cannot be reasonably argued that one with ordinary skill in the art is so devoid of skill and

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common sense that he or she would not have readily recognized that the anchor section and the first tubular graft may either be separately inserted and then joined in situ, or inserted as a unitary whole. Those are the only two possibilities with regard to the insertion of the anchor section and the first tubular graft. In our view, selecting one of the two readily apparent choices would have been well within the basic level of skill and common sense possessed by one with ordinary skill in the art. Moreover, it is incumbent upon Goicoechea as the movant to establish why, given Fogarty's independent claim 41, one with ordinary skill in the art would not have known that the anchor section and the first tubular graft can be inserted as one or separately. Goicoechea set forth no persuasive reasons in that regard.

For the foregoing reasons, Goicoechea has failed to demonstrate that all of its claims 55, 59, 62-65, 88 and 90 do not define the same patentable invention as any one of Fogarty's claims 27-69. Goicoechea's preliminary motion 2 insofar as it seeks a judgment based on no interference-in-fact is denied.

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As for Goicoechea's assertion that Fogarty's claims 27-69, all of Fogarty's claims which have been designated as corresponding to the count in the declaration of this interference, do not correspond to the count, Goicoechea has to satisfy the requirements set forth in 37 CFR § 1.637(c)(4). Goicoechea has to show that each of Fogarty's claims 27-69 does not define the same patentable invention as any of Goicoechea's claims and Martin's claims whose correspondence to the count Goicoechea does not dispute.

As is already discussed above in connection with Goicoechea's assertion of no interference-in-fact, Goicoechea has not established patentable distinction between Fogarty's claims 41-69 and at least Goicoechea's claim 55 and claim 90, and also between Fogarty's claims 27-69 and at least Goicoechea's claim 59. Goicoechea's preliminary motion 2 to designate Fogarty's claims 27-69 as not corresponding to the count is denied.

Nothing presented by Cragg in its brief at final hearing demonstrates that our above-quoted analysis was in error. Fogarty is correct that Cragg continues to attempt an

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inappropriate reading of extraneous limitations from the specification into the claims. Although the specification is useful in interpreting claim language, as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has nonetheless stated, "the name of the game is the claim." In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369, 47 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims--American Perspectives, 21 Int' Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L, 497, 499 (1990) ("The U.S. is strictly an examination country and the main purpose of the examination, to which every application is subjected, is to try to make sure that what each claim defines is patentable. To coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claims."). Reading into the claims an extraneous limitation from the specification is simply improper. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433, 7 USPQ2d 1129, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In E.I. de Pont, 849 F.2d at 1433, 7 USPQ2d at 1131, the Federal Circuit stated:

It is entirely proper to use the specification to interpret what the Patentee meant by a word or phrase in the claim. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867, 228 USPQ 90, 93 (Fed. Cir. 1985). But this is not to be confused with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which is improper. By "extraneous," we mean a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.

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In interpreting its own claims, Cragg in its brief at final hearing begins with a section discussing its disclosure, entitled "Cragg Discloses A Unitary Bifurcated Long Leg/Short Leg Prosthesis" (Emphasis in original). That section ends with this one sentence paragraph:

The specification supports that Cragg's claims require a unitary bifurcated long leg/short leg structure, where "unitary" requires a securing means connecting the portions of the structure.

By the time Cragg made the above-quoted conclusion, it has not yet recited, reproduced, or even referred to any actual language in its claims. That Cragg's specification has a description for a certain embodiment does not necessarily mean that all of Cragg's claims must include the elements of that embodiment. If the claims do not require a unitary structure in the sense that there is a securing means which connects all the parts together, these are extraneous limitations which should not be read into the claims from the specification. Moreover, even Cragg's own specification contains no reference to the term "unitary" on which Cragg now places so much emphasis. Neither does Cragg's own specification contain any reference to words which are generally synonymous with the word "unitary," such as "integral"

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or "one-piece." Thus, what Cragg is arguing in this part is many steps removed from the actual language of the claims.

The bifurcated prosthesis according to Cragg's claim 59 requires (1) a proximal portion, (2) a distal portion, and (3) a separate distal segment. Unlike Cragg's claim 55, Cragg's claim 59 does not require disposing the proximal portion in the blood vessel such that the distal portion extends into a first branched vessel. That means claim 59 is sufficiently broad to have the proximal portion put in place without regard to whether the distal portion is also placed in working position.

Cragg argues that because the word "portion" means part of a whole, the proximal portion and the distal portion must be part of a unitary structure in which the proximal portion and the distal portion is unitary or connected together by some securing means before being introduced into the blood vessel. We are not persuaded by Cragg's argument.

While the word "portion" may indeed mean part of a whole or part of something, Cragg has not submitted any evidence that the so called parts of a whole must be physically attached to each other at all times. In that regard, note that a jig-saw puzzle has many parts or portions but the many pieces don't have to be connected to each other before properly being referred to as portions of the same puzzle. Cragg has not made any meaningful

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showing that the word "portion" as is ordinarily used in the English language requires an actual physical attachment. Nor has Cragg argued that its specification has specially defined the word "portion" in a manner different from its ordinary usage in the English language. Indeed, Cragg even cites to Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Ed. (1994) in its brief at final hearing for the meaning of "portion," which states: "part of something." Note that "part of something" can be conceptual and does not necessarily require a physical connection at all times. Moreover, we note that even Cragg's so called "portions" are not physically connected at all times; indisputably, they have to be preassembled prior to introduction into the patient.

Alternatively, our decision on preliminary motion held that even assuming that the "unitary" feature argued by Cragg is included in all of Cragg's claims corresponding to the count, Fogarty's claim 41 still would have rendered obvious Cragg's claimed invention such as Cragg's claim 59.

Cragg argues (Br. at 18):

The Board states that insertion of the anchor section and the first tubular graft as a unitary whole is only one of two possibilities with regard to the insertion of the Fogarty structure. Paper No. 108, p.15. There is a third possibility ignored by the Board, namely, inserting the anchor section and both tubular grafts at the same time.

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The argument is without merit. We stated (Paper No. 108, at 15) that there are "only two possibilities with regard to the insertion of the anchor section and the first tubular graft" (emphasis added). In that context, the second tubular graft is uninvolved, and how it is introduced is irrelevant.

We adopt and reiterate herein the following portion of our decision on preliminary motions concerning Cragg's preliminary motion 2 (Paper No. 108, pp. 14-16):

Additionally, with respect to Fogarty's claims 41-69, Goicoechea is improperly reading into those claims a specific embodiment from Fogarty's disclosure rather than focusing on the language of the claims themselves. As we discussed in the context of Goicoechea's preliminary motion 1, Fogarty's independent claim 41 is broadly recited and imposes no particular manner for the insertion of the anchor section and the first tubular graft.

Given Fogarty's claim 41, it is left to the discretion of one with ordinary skill in the art just how to introduce the anchor section and the first tubular graft. One with ordinary skill in the art possesses a certain basic level of skill. See, e.g., In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743, 226 USPQ 771, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ([Applicant's] argument presumes stupidity rather than skill). A conclusion of obviousness also may be made based on the common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference. In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 163 USPQ 545, 549 (CCPA 1969). It cannot be reasonably argued that one with ordinary skill in the art is so devoid of skill and common sense that he or she would not have readily recognized that the anchor section and the first tubular graft may either be separately inserted and then joined in situ, or inserted as a unitary whole.

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

Those are the only two possibilities with regard to the insertion of the anchor section and the first tubular graft. In our view, selecting one of the two readily apparent choices would have been well within the basic level of skill and common sense possessed by one with ordinary skill in the art. Moreover, it is incumbent upon Goicoechea as the movant to establish why, given Fogarty's independent claim 41, one with ordinary skill in the art would not have known that the anchor section and the first tubular graft can be inserted as one or separately. Goicoechea set forth no persuasive reasons in that regard.

Cragg dismisses our citation to In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743, 226 USPQ 771, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1985) and In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390, 163 USPQ 545, 549 (CCPA 1969), by arguing that "[b]oth Bozek and Sovish required a disclosure in the prior art references to render the claims obvious."). It appears that Cragg completely misses the point for which we cited to those cases, i.e., that one with ordinary skill in the art is presumed to possess some logic and skill that is independent of what is disclosed in an item of prior art. Here, the starting point is Fogarty's claim 41. In that sense, Fogarty's claim 41 is the disclosure with which one with ordinary skill in the art is presented, in determining whether claims such as Cragg's claim 59 would have been obvious over Fogarty's claim 41. We agree entirely with the following two paragraphs in Fogarty's opposition brief at pages 14-15:

Second, while Cragg would argue that Sovish and Bozek are somehow anomalous, the principle for which

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

they were actually cited in the Decision has been repeatedly followed by this Board; e.g., Ex parte Research and Manufacturing Co., 10 USPQ2d 1657, 1664 (Bd. Pat. App. & Intf. 1989) (skill is presumed on the part of the artisan rather than the converse); Ex parte George, 21 USPQ2d 1058, 1060 n.1 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991) (the ability of one having ordinary skill in the art should not be underestimated); Ex parte Nesbit, 25 USPQ2d 1817, 1823 (Bd. Pat. App. & Intf. 1992) (the law presumes skill on the part of the artisan rather than the converse); Ex parte GPAC Inc., 29 USPQ2d 1401, 1405 (Bd. Pat. App. & Intf. 1993) (the skill of the art must be presumed, not the contrary).

The Board thus found that the worker is not so devoid of skill or common sense that he or she would not have readily recognized that the anchor section and the first tubular graft may either be separately inserted and then joined *in situ*, or inserted as a unitary whole. (Emphasis in original).

Cragg's citation to Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Intern., Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323, 50 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999) is inapposite. The Al-Site case does not stand for the proposition that Fogarty's claim 41 must be combined with another prior art reference in order to render obvious a Cragg claim which corresponds to the count. In contrast, the case supports the position that the perspective from which a prior art reference is viewed is that of a person with ordinary skill in the art.

Cragg further argues that the Board has not explained how, if Fogarty's anchor section and first tubular graft are inserted as one piece, a skilled worker would successfully position that device. According to Cragg, because the first tubular graft of

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Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

Fogarty is within the fabric liner leg 28, one ends up with an anchor section-fabric liner-tubular graft assembly that is not rigid and is not supported. The argument is misdirected and in any event unpersuasive. Here, the starting point for the obviousness analysis is not some embodiment disclosed in Fogarty's specification, but Fogarty's claim 41 which does not require placing the first tubular graft in a fabric liner leg. Moreover, in any event Cragg has submitted no meaningful evidence in the form of declaration or affidavit testimony from anyone to establish that one with ordinary skill in the art would not have known how to introduce the anchor section together with the first tubular graft. As Fogarty has pointed out in its opposition brief, attorney argument cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the record. See, e.g., Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d 1368, 1373, 213 USPQ 196, 200 (CCPA 1982); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782, 193 USPQ 17, 22 (CCPA), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854, 195 USPQ 465 (1977); In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 508, 173 USPQ 356, 358 (CCPA 1972).

Cragg's preliminary motion 2 further seeks to have all of Fogarty's claims corresponding to the count, i.e., claims 27-69, designated as not corresponding to the count. We ruled in the decision on preliminary motions that per 37 CFR § 1.637(c)(4), the motion is without merit because it failed to demonstrate that

Interference No. 104,192
Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

each of Fogarty's claims 27-69 does not define the same patentable invention as any of Cragg's claims and Martin claims whose correspondence to the count is not disputed by Cragg.

Cragg's arguments with regard to designating Fogarty's claims as not corresponding to the count is merely a reference to its arguments alleging no interference-in-fact between Cragg's claims and Fogarty's claims. Cragg evidently is of the view that if it has demonstrated no interference-in-fact between its claims and Martin's claims on the one hand and Fogarty's claims on the other hand, then the case has been made that Fogarty's claims corresponding to the count should be designated as not corresponding to the count. But Cragg has failed to demonstrate no interference-in-fact between its claims and Martin's claims on the one hand and Fogarty's claims on the other hand. Thus, no reason has been shown to designate Fogarty's claims 27-69 as not corresponding to the count. Note also that even if there was no interference-in-fact with respect to any Fogarty claim, Fogarty's application would become uninvolved and there would be no need to designate any of its claims as not corresponding to the count.

For the foregoing reasons, Cragg has shown no error in the denial of Cragg's preliminary motion 2.

Interference No. 104,192
Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

Judgment

It is

ORDERED that judgment as to the subject matter of the count is herein entered against junior party ERIC C. MARTIN and also against junior party ANDREW H. CRAGG and MICHAEL D. DAKE;

FURTHER ORDERED that the junior party ERIC C. MARTIN is not entitled to his patent claims 2-17 which correspond to the count;

FURTHER ORDERED that junior party ANDREW H. CRAGG and MICHAEL D. DAKE are not entitled to their application claims 55, 59, 62-65, 88 and 90 which correspond to the count; and

FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this paper shall be given a paper number and filed in the respective involved application/patent of the parties.¹⁰

¹⁰ Failure to file a copy of any agreement regarding the termination of this proceeding may render the agreement and any resulting patent unenforceable. See section 35 U.S.C. § 135(c) and 37 CFR § 1.661.

Interference No. 104,192
Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

mgk

Fred E. McKelvey, Senior)
Administrative Patent Judge)

Richard E. Schafer)
Richard E. Schafer)
Administrative Patent Judge)

Jameson Lee)
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Administrative Patent Judge)

Sally C. Medley)
Sally C. Medley)
Administrative Patent Judge)

BOARD OF PATENT
APPEALS
AND
INTERFERENCES

Interference No. 104,192
Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty

By Federal Express

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Merriam- Webster's Collegiate[®] Dictionary

TENTH EDITION

Merriam-Webster, Incorporated
Springfield, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

TAB 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BOSTON SCIENTIFIC
TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MEDTRONIC ANEURX, INC. and
ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:01CV02015

Judge: Gladys Kessler

FILED

NOV 15 2001

NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

[PROPOSED] ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT

Defendant Medtronic Aneurx, Inc. has moved to extend to Monday, December 17, 2001 the time in which they may answer, move or otherwise respond to the Complaint of plaintiff, Boston Scientific Technology, Inc. Plaintiff does not oppose this motion.

Accordingly, upon motion of the defendant and for good cause shown, the motion is GRANTED.

Dated: November 15, 2001

Gladys Kessler
United States District Judge

TAB 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 1:01CV 2015 (GK)

v.

MEDTRONIC AVE, INC.
and ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendants.

FILED

DEC 21 2001


NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

PROPOSED ORDER ALLOWING FILING OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Scimed Life Systems, Inc. ("Scimed") has moved to file a Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. and Local Rule 7.1. Defendant Medtronic AVE, Inc. ("Medtronic AVE") and defendant Eric C. Martin ("Martin") have consented in writing to this motion.

Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiff, the motion is GRANTED.

Dated: December 21, 2001


Honorable Gladys Kessler
United States District Judge for the
District of Columbia

(-)

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the

- (1) STIPULATED JOINT MOTION TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT,
- (2) SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, and
- (3) [PROPOSED] ORDER ALLOWING FILING OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

were served this ____ day of December, 2001 by Hand, on the attorneys for defendants as follows:

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Counsel for Eric C. Martin

TAB 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RECEIVED

MAY 1 2002

JUDGE RICHARD LEON

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant,

CASE NO. 1:01CV 2015 (RJL)

v.

MEDTRONIC AVE, INC.,

Defendant and Counterclaimant,

and ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Defendant.

FILED

MAY - 2 2002

NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING SCIMED'S MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL
SCIMED'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AND THE DECLARATION OF GIDON D. STERN
IN SUPPORT OF SCIMED'S OPPOSITION TO MEDTRONIC'S REQUEST FOR
ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO SCIMED**

The matter having come before the Court on plaintiff Scimed Life Systems, Inc. ("Scimed") Motion To File Under Seal (1) SCIMED'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MEDTRONIC'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO SCIMED ("Scimed's Opposition Memorandum) and (2) the DECLARATION OF GIDON D. STERN in support of Scimed's Opposition Memorandum and attached exhibits to be filed under seal pursuant to Local Rule 5.1(j), and the Court having fully considered the arguments in support of and in opposition to that motion:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:


The aforementioned motion is GRANTED.

Scimed's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Metronic's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment As to Scimed ("Scimed's Opposition Memorandum) and the

DECLARATION OF GIDON D. STERN in support of Scimed's Opposition Memorandum and attached exhibits shall be filed under seal, with the exception that the memorandum, declarations and exhibits thereof shall be available to defendant, Medtronic AVE, Inc. and defendant, Eric C. Martin.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May ^{8th} 1, 2002



Honorable Richard J. Leon
United States District Judge for the
District of Columbia

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TAB 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

AUG 30 2003

NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,)

Plaintiff and Counterclaim)
Defendant,)

v.)

Case Number 01-2015 (RJL)

MEDTRONIC AVE INC.,)

Defendant and)
Counterclaimant,)

and ERIC C. MARTIN,)

Defendant and)
Counterclaim-Defendant)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

(August 30, 2003) (# 17, 22, 29, 34)

Three motions are now pending before the Court in the above captioned case. The first is the motion for default judgment by defendant and counterclaimant Medtronic AVE, Inc. ("Medtronic") against defendant and counterclaim-defendant Eric C. Martin and plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Scimed Life Systems, Inc. ("Scimed"). Second is Scimed's motion to dismiss Medtronic's counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, Medtronic has filed a Rule 11 motion for sanctions against Scimed, arguing that Scimed's case is a "sham," and that Scimed's papers contain material

misrepresentations of fact.

For the reasons set forth below the Court hereby grants Medtronic's motion for entry of default judgment against Martin, but reserves ruling on the relief to which Medtronic is entitled. The Court denies Medtronic's motion for default judgment as to Scimed and denies Scimed's motion to dismiss Medtronic's counterclaim. Finally, the Court also denies Medtronic's Rule 11 motion for sanctions.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Scimed brought the instant action pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 146 to contest the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the "Board") of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") regarding certain patent applications for an apparatus for reinforcing a bifurcated lumen. Plaintiff Scimed and defendant and counterclaimant Medtronic each are assignees of record of two, different patent applications for a bifurcated lumen invention;¹ defendant and

¹ Andrew Cragg and Michael Dake filed an application with the USPTO regarding the bifurcated lumen apparatus on June 5, 1995. The application was assigned the serial number 08/461,402 (the "'402 application"). Cragg and Dake assigned all rights in the '402 application to Boston Scientific Technology, Inc., which merged into plaintiff Scimed. Scimed is now the present legal owner of the '402 application. Defendant and counterclaimant Medtronic was assigned its rights in a patent application for the invention by Thomas J. Fogarty, Timothy J. Ryan, and Kirsten Freislinger (collectively referred to as party "Fogarty" in the underlying proceedings at the USPTO). That application was filed with the USPTO on June 5, 1995, and assigned the serial number 08/463,836 (the "'836 application"). Fogarty assigned its rights in the '836 application to Medtronic Aneurx, Inc., which merged into Medtronic AVE, Inc. Defendant Medtronic is now the

counterclaim-defendant Eric C. Martin was awarded a patent for the same apparatus. The USPTO declared an interference on April 23, 1998, between Scimed's patent application (the "Cragg" or "'402 application"), Medtronic's patent application (the "Fogarty" or "'836 application") and Martin's patent (the "Martin" or "'817 patent"). This interference proceeding was assigned Interference No. 104,192, and is referred to as the "'192 interference." Shortly thereafter, on September 20, 1998, Martin and Scimed entered into an option and license agreement under which Scimed had an exclusive option to purchase the rights to Martin's '817 patent. Neither Scimed nor Martin disclosed the existence of this agreement to Medtronic or the Board before the Board rendered its decision in the '192 interference.²

The Board yielded its decisions pertaining to the '192 interference on July 27, 2001. Scimed filed a complaint in this Court on September 25, 2001, challenging the Board's decisions that were adverse to its interests in the '402 application. Subsequently, Scimed filed an amended complaint on November 9, 2001, and a second amended complaint on December 21, 2001. Defendant Medtronic filed its answer to the second amended complaint and its counterclaim on January 2, 2002. In turn, Scimed filed its

legal owner of the '836 application.

² Scimed disclosed the existence of the agreement with Martin on March 21, 2002; Medtronic maintains that the disclosure was untimely and in violation of the pertinent regulations contained in 37 C.F.R. § 1.602. *See* Medtronic Mot. for Default Judgment at 3-4. Scimed contends that the disclosure was timely and proper. As this issue is irrelevant to the Court's resolution of the motions now before it, the Court will not consider the parties' arguments on this issue at this time.

answer to Medtronic's counterclaim on January 18, 2002, and then separately filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim almost five months later, on May 17, 2002, arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Medtronic's claims.

As defendant and counterclaim-defendant Martin never filed an answer to Medtronic's counterclaim, Medtronic filed a motion for default judgment against Martin on April 23, 2002.³ In its motion for default judgment, Medtronic asked this Court not only to grant default judgment as to Martin, but also as to Scimed for Martin's failure to answer the counterclaim. According to Medtronic, because Scimed is the owner of an exclusive license to Martin's '817 patent, it has a duty under that license to litigate all claims stemming from the patent. Under Medtronic's theory, default as to Martin is default as to Scimed, even though Scimed filed a timely answer to the counterclaim.

Additionally, Medtronic brings a Rule 11 motion for sanctions against Scimed, coincidentally filed on the same day as Scimed's motion to dismiss Medtronic's counterclaim. Medtronic argues that Scimed has materially misrepresented its relationship with Martin as to whether Scimed or Martin owns all right, title, and interest in the '817 patent. Due to these alleged misrepresentations, Medtronic asks the Court to dismiss this case "as sanction for Scimed's conduct and Martin's collusion in that conduct." Medtronic Mot. for Sanctions at 10.

³ The Clerk of Courts made an entry of default against Martin on the same day.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Scimed's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Medtronic's Counterclaim for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Denied

Scimed asks this Court to dismiss Medtronic's counterclaim against it and against Martin pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), claiming that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 146 to hear Medtronic's claim.⁴ The Court disagrees, and denies Scimed's motion to dismiss.

In its counterclaim against Scimed and Martin, Medtronic asks this Court, in essence, to affirm the Board's decisions that were favorable to Medtronic, reverse those that were not, and to adjudge that Medtronic is entitled to a Letters Patent of the United States for the bifurcated lumen invention. *See* Medtronic Counterclaim at 10. At issue for purposes of Scimed's motion to dismiss are three preliminary motions filed by Fogarty — who assigned its rights in the patent application to Medtronic — with the Board. In Preliminary Motion No. 1, Fogarty argued that the claims contained in the Cragg/Scimed patent application were not patentable. Additionally, in Preliminary Motion No. 3, Fogarty challenged any benefit awarded to the Cragg/Scimed patent application due to an earlier filing date of a European patent application. Finally, Fogarty alleged in

⁴ Section 146 provides, in relevant part, that "Any party to an interference dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences on the interference, may have remedy by civil action, if commenced within such time after such decision, not less than sixty days"

Preliminary Motion No. 4 that certain claims in Martin's patent and in the Cragg/Scimed patent application were unpatentable.

The Board denied each of these motions on February 11, 2000. Six months later on August 14, 2000, the Board asked Fogarty "to file a paper identifying all [previous] motion decisions adverse to party Fogarty which Fogarty believes still must be considered at final hearing even if all issues raised by Party Cragg [Scimed] for final hearing are decided against party Cragg." Scimed Mot. to Dismiss at 2. In response, Fogarty submitted to the Board that Preliminary Motion Nos. 1, 3, 4, among others, "would become moot and need not be considered in the event judgment is entered against Cragg. (While the motions thus need not be reviewed, reference to Cragg's position and/or the Board's rulings with respect to certain of these may still be required.)." At the final hearing before the Board on the '192 interference, Preliminary Motions 1, 3 and 4 were neither discussed by Cragg or Fogarty nor briefed by the parties as part of the proceeding. When the Board rendered its decision on July 27, 2001 awarding priority of invention to the '836 or Fogarty/Medtronic application over the '402 or Cragg/Scimed application, the judgment did not address any of the issues raised in Fogarty's Preliminary Motions 1, 3 and 4. *See* Medtronic Mot. for Default Judgment, Exh. A (Board's Op. in the '192 interference).

Despite the fact that the issues were never briefed by the parties nor discussed by the Board during the final hearing proceedings on the '192 interference, Medtronic now

asks this Court to reverse the Board's rejection of Fogarty Preliminary Motions 1, 3 and 4. Both Medtronic and Scimed primarily cite the same cases as support for their arguments regarding this Court's subject matter jurisdiction to hear Medtronic's counterclaim: *Conservolite, Inc. v. Widmayer*, 21 F.3d 1098, 1102 9Fed. Cir. 1994) and *General Instrument Corp. v. Scientific-Atlanta*, 995 F.2d 209, 214 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

While the cases provide some guidance, they are not factually analogous to the situation presently before the Court. In *Conservolite*, the party bringing a Section 146 action in district court asked the court to consider an issue that the party did not raise either by preliminary motion or at the final hearing. The Federal Circuit in *Conservolite* held that a party's failure to raise the issue in a preliminary motion not only precluded it not from raising the matter at the final hearing, but also precluded district court review. See *Conservolite*, 21 F.3d at 1101. Here, the situation before the Court is different. Unlike the party that brought a Section 146 action in *Conservolite*, Medtronic raised in Preliminary Motions 1, 3, and 4 the same issues it now brings in its counterclaim, although those issues were not addressed at the final hearing.

The Court must therefore determine whether failure to introduce an issue during a final hearing on an interference — even if the issue was raised by preliminary motion — prevents a district court from considering the issue during a Section 146 action. While *Conservolite* states that "an action under § 146 is essentially a proceeding to review the action of the Board," *id.*, the Court cannot conclude that it stands for the proposition that

Scimed advances: that district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over issues raised in preliminary motions but not addressed at a final hearing. *See* Scimed Reply at 4 (arguing that "[i]f an issue is not raised at final hearing or considered in the Board's final decision, it cannot be raised in a Section 146 action."). The Federal Circuit's opinion in *Conservolite* recognizes as much when it states that "[i]n order for an issue to have been raised adequately so that it qualifies for consideration in a Section 146 proceeding, the issue should have been raised as specified in the PTO's interference rules, for example, *through preliminary motions*, motions to correct inventorship, miscellaneous motions, belated motions delayed for good cause, or opposition to these motions." *Id.* at 1102 (emphasis added). Medtronic complied with that requirement by bringing Preliminary Motions 1, 3, and 4. *See* Scimed Reply at 5. Neither *Conservolite*, nor the pertinent statute and regulation, require more. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 146; 37 C.F.R. § 1.658.

Furthermore, the Court does not believe that allowing Medtronic to raise issues here that were not specifically briefed or raised during the final hearing to be inconsistent with the general principle that administrative remedies must be exhausted before seeking district court review. This is especially true because the Board itself limited the issues to be considered at the final hearing when it asked Medtronic to list only those issues Medtronic believed "still must be considered at final hearing *even if all issues raised by Party Cragg [Scimed] for final hearing are decided against party Cragg.*" Scimed Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Medtronic's answer to that question was a qualified one: only if all issues

were decided against Cragg were Medtronic's preliminary motions moot. As the Board limited the issues to be considered, and because Fogarty/Medtronic raised the issues in preliminary motions which were denied by the Board, the Court concludes that permitting Medtronic to bring them here in its counterclaim is "not wasteful of administrative and judicial resources." *Conservolite*, 21 F.3d at 1102. Moreover, the Court does not find Medtronic waived its claims for the same reasons it finds that Medtronic sufficiently exhausted its administrative remedies.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Scimed's motion to dismiss Medtronic's counterclaim.

B. Medtronic's Motion for Default Judgment Against Scimed is Denied

Medtronic has moved for default judgment against Scimed under the theory that Scimed was the true party-in-interest to Martin's patent, and had a duty to defend Martin in all litigation arising from that patent. Default against Martin, under the defendant's theory, is also default against the plaintiff, Scimed.

The standard in this court for granting a motion for default judgment is set forth in *Jackson v. Beech*, 636 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1980), as well as Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In *Jackson*, the Circuit Court specifically explained that default judgment is disfavored when it stated that "modern federal procedure favors a trial on the merits over a default judgment," and that default judgment is normally reserved for a

"totally unresponsive party." *Id.* at 835. Scimed, in this case, has not been a totally unresponsive party. It has filed its opposition to the motion for default judgment and the motion for sanctions in a timely manner. It cannot be said that Scimed is being unresponsive or otherwise dilatory in defending its interests.

This Court has been unable to find support in the law for entering default judgment against a party because that party has a duty to defend a second party, who is truly in default for failing to appear or is totally responsive, under a licensing agreement. Those cases where a duty to defend has resulted in default judgment have been limited to cases between an insured and an insurer — where there has been privity in contract between those parties, and the insured, rather than a third party, sought to enforce the contract and the insurer's duty to defend. *See, e.g., Weiss v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.* 283 F.3d 790 (6th Cir. 2002); *Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Assoc. v. United Pacific Ins. Co.*, 219 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court does not find support for a third party - like Medtronic - seeking to enforce a contractual duty to defend between two other parties in order to obtain default judgment.

In any event, Medtronic has not satisfied the test set for granting default judgment set forth by this Circuit in *Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking*, 825 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir 1987). The Court in *Combs* listed three factors to consider when setting aside default judgment, which is relevant to this Court's determination as to whether default judgment is appropriate in the first place: whether the default was willful, whether denying default

judgment would prejudice the moving party, and whether the alleged defense - here, the plaintiff's claim - is meritorious. As mentioned previously, the Court does not find willful default in this case. Scimed has been responsive to every pleading and motion. The court also does not find that denying default judgment would prejudice Medtronic at this early stage in the proceedings.

Given this Circuit's disfavor toward default judgment and strong preference for adjudication of claims on their merits, if Medtronic's position is as truly meritorious as it claims in its papers, a motion for summary judgment would be the proper procedure for addressing which party is the true party at interest in the Martin patent. A motion for default judgment should not be used as a motion in limine to prevent a party from presenting proofs or making claims.

For those reasons set forth above, Medtronic's motion for default judgment against Scimed is denied.

C. Medtronic's Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant and Counterclaim Defendant Martin is Granted

Although the Court denies Medtronic's motion for default judgment against Scimed, the Court grants its motion for entry of default judgment as to Martin, but reserves ruling on what relief should be granted.

Applying the *Combs* test, discussed above, the Court finds that Medtronic has satisfied the first requirement by showing that Martin's default is willful. Martin has been

served with copies of the pleadings and motions filed in this case. He has not responded to Scimed's complaint, Medtronic's counterclaim, or Medtronic's motion for default judgment. However, Martin has retained counsel and filed a declaration included as Exhibit 5 to Scimed's opposition to Medtronic's motion for entry of default judgment. Given that he has retained counsel, has received copies of all pleadings and motions filed in this case, and has been a "totally unresponsive party" to this filings, *Jackson*, 636 F.2d at 836, the Court can only conclude that Martin's default is willful, rather than the result of negligence on his or his attorney's part.

As Martin has neither opposed the entry of default judgment against him nor suggested he may have a meritorious defense to Medtronic's counterclaim, the Court need not consider the remaining two prongs of the *Combs* test. Although Martin has willfully defaulted, the question of the relief to which Medtronic is entitled due to his default is a complicated one. In its motion for default judgment, Medtronic, in essence, asks this Court to reverse the Board's decisions that are adverse to Medtronic's interest in the '836 patent application, and affirm those that are favorable.⁵ Entering a judgment against

⁵ Specifically, Medtronic asks this Court to grant the following relief:

- (1) Reversing the Patent Board's decision concerning Fogarty's Preliminary Motion No. 4;
- (2) Reversing those portions of the Patent Board's decision of July 27, 2001 with regard to the '192 interference that are adverse to Fogarty; and
- (3) Adjudging that Medtronic is entitled to a Letters Patent of the United States for the invention disclosed in the '836 Application

Martin for this relief, however, necessarily gives Medtronic the relief it seeks against Scimed as well — relief the Court denied to Medtronic when it rejected its motion for default judgment against Scimed. The Court cannot see how it is possible to enter default judgment against Martin without also simultaneously, and inadvertently, entering judgment against Scimed on the underlying issues of Medtronic's counterclaim.

While finding that Martin is in default, the Court will therefore reserve entering judgment against Martin until Medtronic's counterclaim is adjudicated on the merits.

D. Medtronic's Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions Against Scimed is Denied

Medtronic charges that Scimed has made misrepresentations to the Court that "go to the core of the dispute between the parties," Medtronic Mot. for Sanctions at 1, and requests that this Court sanction Scimed for this alleged misconduct by dismissing its complaint. The Court declines to do so.

The charges made in Medtronic's motion for sanctions and Scimed's opposition go, as Medtronic notes, to the heart of this case: which party is entitled to the rights for the bifurcated lumen patent. To resolve the motion for sanctions either in Scimed's or Medtronic's favor, the Court must necessarily resolve the merits of the underlying dispute without the benefit of discovery. To do so at this stage in the litigation would not be fair

Medtronic Mot. for Default Judgment at 5.

to either side. Therefore, without ruling one way or the other as to the factual allegations contained in Medtronic's motion and Scimed's opposition, the Court denies Medtronic's motion for sanctions.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

GRANTS Medtronic's motion for entry of default judgment against Martin (#17),
but reserves ruling on the relief to which Medtronic is entitled;

DENIES Medtronic's motion for default judgment as to Scimed (#17);

DENIES Scimed's motion to dismiss Medtronic's counterclaim (#22); and


DENIES Medtronic's motion for sanctions (#23).

In addition the Court also:

GRANTS Scimed's motion for Gideon Stern to appear *pro hac vice* for Scimed
(#29); and

GRANTS Scimed's motion for leave to file the Patent Office's Decision to Pending
Motions (#34).

SO ORDERED.



RICHARD J. LEON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

TAB 7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

MAR 25 2004

Clerk, U.S. District Court
District of Columbia

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant,

v.

MEDTRONIC AVE, INC.,

Defendant and Counterclaimant,

and

ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:01 CV 02015

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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CLERK

STIPULATION AND ORDER

WHEREAS on July 27, 2001 the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued a Final Decision and Judgment ("July 27, 2001 Final Decision") in Interference No. 104,192 involving a single count and the following applications and patent of the parties:

Fogarty *et al.* United States Patent Application Serial No. 08/463,836
owned by Medtronic AVE, Inc., now known as Medtronic Vascular, Inc.
("Medtronic");

Cragg *et al.* United States Patent Application Serial No. 08/461,402
owned by Scimed Life Systems, Inc. ("Scimed"); and

Martin United States Patent No. 5,575,817 owned by Eric. C. Martin
("Martin").

WHEREAS the July 27, 2001 Final Decision awarded priority of invention to
Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) for the subject matter of the single count;

WHEREAS on December 17, 2001 Scimed filed a Second Amended Complaint
requesting review of certain rulings in the July 27, 2001 Final Decision, including the
award of priority of invention to Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic);

WHEREAS on January 2, 2002, Medtronic filed an Answer, Counterclaim and
Cross-Claim requesting review of certain rulings in the July 27, 2001 Final Decision;

WHEREAS Martin did not respond to Scimed's Second Amended Complaint or
to Medtronic's Answer and Cross-Claim; and

WHEREAS the Court ruled Martin in default for failure to respond to
Medtronic's Cross-Claim.

NOW THEREFORE Medtronic and Scimed desire to limit and expedite the
remaining issues in dispute between them and therefore agree as follows:

1. Scimed agrees that in this action it will not rely on Martin's alleged date of
invention to prove a date of invention for the inventors of Scimed's Cragg *et al.*
Application Serial No. 08/461,402. Medtronic and Scimed reserve all rights against
Martin.
2. Medtronic agrees to withdraw, with prejudice, the Complaint in *Medtronic
Vascular Inc. v. James E. Rogan and Nicholas P. Goldici*, Case No. 1:03 CV 02466, filed
on November 24, 2003 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

3. Medtronic and Scimed agree to limit the issues in this case to the following:

(a) Whether the Board erroneously affirmed its grant of *Fogarty et al.* (Medtronic) Motion 12 in its July 27, 2001 Final Decision denying *Cragg et al.* (Scimed) benefit of the February 9, 1994 filing date of its European application No. 94400284.9 as a date of invention for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192;¹

(b) If the answer to issue (a) is yes and the Court elects to determine the issue of priority, then whether *Fogarty et al.* (Medtronic) has established a date of invention prior to February 9, 1994 for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192; and

(c) If the answer to issue (a) is yes and the Court elects not to determine the issue of priority, then the case may be remanded to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for determination of whether *Fogarty et al.* (Medtronic) has established a date of invention prior to February 9, 1994 for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192.

4. Medtronic and Scimed further agree that if the answer to issue (a) is no, then *Fogarty et al.* (Medtronic) is entitled to an award of priority for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192, and the Board's award of priority to *Fogarty et al.* (Medtronic) in the July 27, 2001 Final Decision should be affirmed.

5. Medtronic and Scimed further agree that if the answer to (a) is yes and the Court determines that the answer to (b) is no, then *Cragg et al.* (Scimed) is entitled to an

¹ The applicable burdens of proof are not intended to be modified by this Agreement.

award of priority for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192, and the Board's award of priority to Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) in the July 27, 2001 Final Decision should be reversed.

6. Medtronic and Scimed further agree that if the answer to (a) is yes and the Court determines that the answer to (b) is yes, then Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) is entitled to an award of priority for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192, and the Board's award of priority to Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) in the July 27, 2001 Final Decision should be affirmed.

7. If either party is dissatisfied with the final judgment of the Court or the final decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences upon remand, the dissatisfied party may pursue appropriate review.

8. Medtronic and Scimed agree that amended pleadings will be filed in this case reflecting this agreement to limit the issues.

IT IS AGREED TO AND ORDERED THAT:

1. Pleadings filed in this case hereafter shall bear the following caption:

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant,

v.

MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC.,

Defendant and Counterclaimant,

and

ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:01 CV 02015 (RJL)

2. Medtronic is directed to withdraw, with prejudice, its Complaint in *Medtronic Vascular Inc. v. James E. Rogan and Nicholas P. Goldici*, Case No. 1:03 CV 02466, filed on November 24, 2003 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia within 14 days of entry of this Order.

3. The issues as between Scimed and Medtronic in this action are limited to the following:

- (a) Whether the Board erroneously affirmed its grant of Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) Motion 12 in its July 27, 2001 Final Decision denying Cragg *et al.* (Scimed) benefit of the February 9, 1994 filing date of its European application



No. 94400284.9 as a date of invention for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192;

(b) If the answer to issue (a) is yes and the Court elects to determine the issue of priority, then whether Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) has established a date of invention prior to February 9, 1994 for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192; and

(c) If the answer to issue (a) is yes and the Court elects not to determine the issue of priority, then the case may be remanded to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for determination of whether Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) has established a date of invention prior to February 9, 1994 for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192.


4. Scimed is directed to file a Third Amended Complaint consistent with the above statement within 14 days of entry of this Order. Medtronic is directed to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim that is consistent with the above statements within 14 days of service of the Third Amended Complaint.

STIPULATED AND AGREED TO BY

 Gidon D. Stern Thomas E. Friebe (D.C. Bar No. 290627) Cathy J. Chin Max Bachrach (D.C. Bar No. 477267) JONES DAY 222 East 41 st Street New York, New York 10017 Attorneys for Scimed Life Systems, Inc.	 Donna M. Tanguay (D.C. Bar No. 4496) Mark G. Davis (D.C. Bar No. 412228) John R. Fuisz (D.C. Bar No. 439698) McDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY 600 13th St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-3096 Attorneys for Medtronic Vascular, Inc.
--	--

SO ORDERED

3/25/84



Honorable Richard J. Leon
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

WDC99 853493-4.052734.0050

NYJD: 1490229.3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the STIPULATION AND
ORDER was served this 18th day of February, 2004, as follows:

Gidon D. Stern (Via Federal Express)
Thomas E. Friebe
Jones Day
222 East 41st Street
New York, NY 10017

Counsel for Plaintiff Scimed Life Systems, Inc.

Robert J. Koch (Via Hand Delivery)
Fulbright & Jaworski
801 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20004

Attorney for Defendant Eric C. Martin

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Eric C. Martin", written over a horizontal line.

TAB 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

SEP 13 2004

NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC.,

Defendant and Counterclaimant,

and ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:01CV2015 (RJL)

PROTECTIVE ORDER

WHEREAS, Medtronic Vascular, Inc. ("Medtronic") and Scimed Life Systems, Inc. ("Scimed") each may seek discovery or documents, information or other materials which may contain or relate to, *inter alia*, valuable research, development, commercial, financial and technical proprietary data, or other information that another party or a nonparty regards as confidential, proprietary or trade secret information of another party or of a nonparty in the above-captioned action (the "Action");

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following Protective Order be entered in this Action:

1. This Protective Order shall cover all information, documents, or tangible items disclosed and/or produced in connection with any discovery taken in the above-captioned action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules of Civil Practice and Procedure of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or disclosed and/or produced in connection with any hearings or other proceedings in the above-captioned action. All

(2)

information, documents, or tangible items covered by this Protective Order shall be used only for the purposes of this litigation and shall not be used for any purpose outside of this litigation.

2. The following classification shall apply:

a. "Confidential Information" shall mean and include any document (whether in hard copy or electronic or computer readable form), thing, deposition testimony, interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admissions and/or production, or other information provided in discovery in this Action ("Discovery Material"), which contains non-public, confidential or proprietary information, whether personal or business-related, including but not limited to information that constitutes, reflects, or concerns trade secrets, know-how or proprietary data, business, financial or commercial information, the disclosure of which is likely to cause harm to the competitive position of the party making the confidential designations on Discovery Material ("the Designating Party").

b. All such Confidential designations shall be made in good faith by the Designating Party and made at the time of disclosure, production, or tender to the party receiving the same ("Receiving Party"), or at such other time as permitted by this Protective Order, provided that the inadvertent failure to so designate does not constitute a waiver of such claim, and a party may so designate Discovery Material after such Discovery Material has been produced, with the effect that such Discovery Material is thereafter subject to the protections of this Protective Order in accordance with such designation.

c. When the Designating Party produces files, records or materials for inspection, no marking need be made in advance of the inspection. All files, records, and materials subject to inspection shall be treated as "Confidential." Upon selection of files,

records, or materials for copying, the witness or producing party shall mark the copies with the appropriate classification prior to production to the inspecting party.

d. A Confidential Designation shall constitute a representation that such Discovery Material has been reviewed by an attorney for the Designating Party and that there is a valid basis for such designation.

3. The designation of Discovery Material as Confidential in the form of documents, responses to requests for admission and interrogatories, or other tangible materials (including, without limitation, CD-ROMs and tapes) other than depositions or other pretrial testimony shall be made by the Designating Party in the following manner:

a. Documents designated "Confidential" shall be so marked by conspicuously affixing the legend "CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER" on each page containing any Confidential Information (or in the case of computer medium on the medium and its label and/or cover) to which the designation applies. Such designated Discovery Material shall be identified by Bates number. To the extent practical, the Confidential legend shall be placed near the Bates number;

4. Confidential Information shall not include any Discovery Materials which:

a. Have been or become lawfully in the possession of the Receiving Party through communications other than production or disclosure in this Action, or in other litigation, for example, as a result of legitimate business dealings between the parties, unless those documents are covered by a separate non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement, in which case the Receiving Party may continue to use such documents in the course of its business subject to those agreements; or

b. Have been or become part of the public domain by publication or otherwise and not due to any unauthorized act or omission on the part of the Receiving Party or any of its authorized representatives or designees under this Protective Order. Nothing herein shall impose any restriction on the use or disclosure by a party or nonparty of its own documents or information.

5. Subject to paragraph 6 of this Protective Order, "Qualified Persons" having access to Discovery Material designated "Confidential Information" under this Protective Order, in this Action are:

a. McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, attorneys of record for Medtronic, their stenographic, clerical and paralegal employees whose duties and responsibilities require access to such materials;

b. Jones Day, attorneys of record for Scimed, their stenographic, clerical and paralegal employees whose duties and responsibilities require access to such materials;

c. For each party, a total of three (3) in-house counsel or patent agents (collectively "in-house counsel") whose names are listed below and who have responsibility for maintaining, defending or evaluating this litigation. The approved in-house counsel are as follows:

	Medtronic, Inc.	Scimed Life Systems, Inc.
Name	Sue R. Halverson	Luke R. Dohmen
Title	Vice President, Assistant General Counsel, Litigation	Vice President and Chief Patent Counsel, Scimed Life Systems, Inc.
Name	Michael J. Jaro	Peter J. Gafner
Title	Chief Patent Counsel	Director and Managing Counsel for Cardiology Litigation, Scimed Life Systems, Inc.

Name	Medicore, Inc.	Scimed Life Systems, Inc.
Title		Steven A. McAuley Patent Counsel, Scimed Life Systems, Inc.

The parties may identify additional in-house counsel who meet[s] the above criteria for inclusion on this list following execution of this Protective Order by providing written notice of the names of the additional in-house counsel to the other parties pursuant to Paragraph 7. The parties to this Action may substitute in-house counsel who meet the above criteria for good cause shown;

d. Retained independent consultants or experts, for purposes of this Action only (as well as their staff, stenographic, and clerical employees whose duties and responsibilities require access to such materials) who are not current employees of any party to this litigation, or any direct competitor of any party to this litigation;

e. The Court, Court personnel, and stenographic and video reporters engaged in proceedings incident to this Action;

f. Outside document copying services, document coding or computerization services, trial graphics consultants, jury and trial consultants, and other entities retained by counsel of record to aid in the preparation of or in the trial of this action. The class of persons identified in this subsection does not include any independent consultants or experts as set forth in subsection (d) above. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Protective Order, access to Confidential documents shall be permitted to the entities listed in this subsection (f), without need for the completion of Exhibit A or the execution of Exhibit B. The outside counsel providing Confidential documents to an entity listed in this subsection shall be responsible for that entity's compliance with the provisions of this Protective Order.

6. Qualified Persons defined in paragraph 5(d) shall be allowed access to Confidential Information only after complying with the following procedure:

a. A Receiving Party who desires to give access to Discovery Materials designated by another party or witness as Confidential Information to a person described in paragraph 5(d) shall first provide written notice to the Designating Party of the proposed person to receive such materials. The written notice shall include a written list, in a form similar to Exhibit A hereto, setting forth the name of the person, his or her occupation, and business address, a curriculum vitae and disclosure of any past or current relationship with any party in this Action. The Designating Party shall have seven (7) business days after receipt of the written notice to object in writing to the disclosure of Confidential Information to the proposed expert or consultant. If the parties are unable to resolve that objection, the objecting party shall, no later than five (5) business days after objection, move the Court for an order prohibiting the disclosure at issue. The objecting party shall have the burden of persuasion that disclosure should not be made. A failure by the Designating Party to timely serve an objection or file a motion shall be deemed to constitute approval of disclosure to the proposed person. If a written objection and a timely motion to prohibit disclosure has been made, no Confidential Information shall be made available to the proposed expert or consultant unless and until the Court rules that disclosure can be made. This objection procedure does not apply to the approved individuals already listed in paragraph 5(c);

b. Before receiving any Confidential Information, the person shall be furnished with a copy of this Protective Order and shall acknowledge, by executing the acknowledgment form attached hereto as Exhibit B, that he or she has read this Protective Order, understands it, and agrees to be bound by it, and also expressly consents to the jurisdiction of this

Court in connection with any proceeding or hearing relating to the enforcement of this Protective Order. In-house attorneys authorized to receive Confidential Information shall not be required to execute the acknowledgment form, but shall otherwise be bound by its terms;

c. Outside counsel for each Receiving Party shall retain a copy of each such written list (Exhibit A) and acknowledgment form (Exhibit B), and shall serve opposing counsel with a copy of these documents upon request and thereafter upon revision of such documents.

7. Confidential Information and the substance or content thereof, including any notes, memoranda or other similar documents relating thereto, shall be used by a Receiving Party and its authorized representative or designees under this Protective Order solely for the purpose of this Action and any appeals therefrom, and shall not be made available, or disclosed, or summarized to any persons, including the parties, other than as permitted by paragraphs 5-6 of this Protective Order. Confidential Information shall be maintained by the Receiving Party under the overall supervision of outside counsel.

8. Any person in possession of Confidential Information shall exercise care with regard to the storage, custody or use of such Confidential Information in order to ensure that the Confidential nature of the same is maintained.

9. If Confidential Information is disclosed to anyone other than in a manner authorized by this Protective Order, the party responsible for such disclosure must: (a) immediately bring all pertinent facts relating to such disclosure (including to whom the disclosure was made and the specific documents or information disclosed) to the attention of the Designating Party of the Confidential Information; (b) retrieve such information, or, where the information is not retrievable, certify that it has been lost or destroyed and that no copies are within the possession, custody or control of unauthorized recipients of the information,

documents, or materials; and (c) request that the person to whom the information was disclosed sign an acknowledgement in the form of Exhibit B; and (d) prevent further disclosure.

10. When Confidential Information is discussed, quoted or referred to in any deposition, the disclosing party shall ensure that only persons permitted by paragraph 5 of this Protective Order to have access to such Information are present. During any hearing or trial persons not authorized to have access to confidential information shall be asked to leave the courtroom when such Confidential Information is being published. The confidentiality of evidence not published in open court during any hearing or trial is not waived.

11. During the course of preparing for a deposition or testimony, a fact deponent/witness may be shown Confidential Information from another party's documents strictly limited to those documents which on their face reveal that they were authored or received in the normal course of business by the deponent/witness. Use of Confidential Information during a deposition shall be subject to compliance with this Order.

12. Any deposition transcript containing Confidential Information shall be marked on the cover as "Confidential Pursuant To Protective Order," and shall indicate as appropriate within the transcript what information has been so designated. Whenever possible, the stenographic reporter shall be requested prior to the deposition (where the attorneys have reason to believe the testimony will contain Confidential Information) or when the Confidential Information is disclosed (when not previously anticipated) to separate those portions of the transcript containing Confidential Information and separately bind it from the non-confidential portions. However, a party may designate any portion or all (if appropriate) of the transcript as containing Confidential Information by so advising, with reasonable precision as to the affected testimony, the deposition reporter, who shall accordingly indicate in the deposition transcript

what portion(s) of the testimony (or exhibits thereto) were so designated, or by so advising all other parties in writing, and with page and line designations, within ten (10) business days after receipt of the transcript. Until ten (10) business days have passed after the receipt of any transcript, that entire transcript shall be deemed to be Confidential. In the event of disagreement about the confidential status of a deposition transcript, it shall continue to be treated as Confidential until the Court rules otherwise.

13. Any Designating Party may redact from the documents and things it produces (1) sensitive matter not relevant to the subject matter of this litigation, and (2) matter that the Designating Party claims is subject to attorney-client privilege, work product immunity, a legal prohibition against disclosure, private patient medical data, or other privilege or immunity. The Designating Party shall mark each document or thing where matter has been redacted with a legend stating "REDACTED FOR RELEVANCE" or "REDACTED FOR PRIVILEGE" as appropriate, or a comparable notice. Where a document consists of more than one page, at least the first page and each page on which information has been redacted shall be so marked. The Designating Party shall preserve an unredacted version of each such document. This provision shall not affect any obligation to provide a log of information redacted or otherwise withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege, work product immunity, a legal prohibition against disclosure, or other privilege or immunity.

14. Any pleading, paper or other document filed in this action which contains or discloses Confidential Information shall be filed under seal and shall be maintained under seal according to the terms of this Protective Order or as otherwise determined by the Court. When filing pleadings, motions, briefs, discovery materials, and other papers, which contain Confidential Information, the party so filing shall designate the following on the first page of

filed documents: "Filed Under Seal - Subject To Protective Order - Contains Confidential Material - May Only Be Opened by Order of the Court" and shall otherwise comply with the Court's order on the subject.

15. Entering into, agreeing to and/or producing or receiving Confidential Information or otherwise complying with the terms of this Protective Order shall not:

- a. Operate as an admission by any party that any Discovery Material designated as Confidential Information contains or reflects trade secrets or any other type of confidential or proprietary information entitled to protection under applicable law;
- b. Prejudice in any way the rights of any party to object to the production of documents it considers not subject to discovery, or operate as an admission by any party that the restrictions and procedures set forth herein constitute adequate protection for any particular information deemed by any party to be Confidential Information;
- c. Prejudice in any way the rights of any party to object to the authenticity or admissibility into evidence of any document, testimony or the evidence subject to this Protective Order;
- d. Prejudice in any way the rights of any party to seek a determination by the Court whether any Discovery Material or Confidential Information should be subject to the terms of this Protective Order;
- e. Prejudice in any way the rights of any party to petition the Court for a further protective order, or modification or amendment of this order, relating to any purportedly Confidential Information;

f. Prejudice in any way the rights of any party to petition the Court for permission to disclose or use particular Confidential Information more broadly than would otherwise be permitted by the terms of this Protective Order; or

g. Prevent any Designating Party from agreeing to alter or waive the provisions or protections provided for herein with respect to any particular Discovery Material designated as Confidential Information by that party.

16. If a party disagrees with any designation of Confidential Information, such party shall first make its objection known to the producing party and request a change of designation. The parties shall first try to resolve such dispute in good faith on an informal basis. If the dispute cannot be resolved, the party challenging the designation may request appropriate relief from the Court no sooner than five (5) days following the service of a written notice of disagreement. The burden of proving that information has been properly designated as Confidential is on the party making such designation. Until a determination by the Court, the information in issue shall be treated as originally designated by the producing party. Any failure to object to any material being designated as Confidential shall not be construed as an admission by any non-designating party that the material constitutes or contains a trade secret or other confidential information.

17. All provisions of this Protective Order restricting the use of information obtained during discovery shall continue to be binding on the parties and all persons who have received information under this Protective Order, after the conclusion of this action, including all appeals, until further Order of the Court, unless the parties agree otherwise in writing. Upon conclusion of this matter, outside experts and consultants shall return or destroy all Confidential Information in their possession, including notes or other documents prepared relating to such information. Any and all originals and copies of Discovery Materials designated Confidential (including all

originals or copies in the possession of any outside experts or consultants, and any notes or other documents prepared by such persons relating to any Confidential Materials) shall, at the request of the producing party, be returned to the party within sixty (60) days after a final judgment herein or settlement of this Action, or, at the option of the producing party, destroyed in that time frame, except that outside counsel for each party may maintain in its files one copy of each pleading filed with the Court, each deposition transcript together with the exhibits marked at the deposition, and documents constituting work product which were internally generated based upon or which include Confidential Information. In the event that outside counsel maintains such documents, it shall not disclose material containing any type of Confidential Information to another party absent subpoena or court order. In the event that documents are returned to or destroyed at the request of the producing party, the other party or its outside counsel shall certify in writing that all such documents have been returned or destroyed, as the case may be.

18. By entering this Protective Order and limiting the disclosure of information in this case, the Court does not intend to preclude another court from finding that information may be relevant and subject to disclosure in another case. Any person or party subject to this Protective Order who becomes subject to a motion to disclose another party's information designated Confidential Information pursuant to this Protective Order shall promptly notify that party of the motion so that the party may have an opportunity to appear and be heard on whether that information should be disclosed. If any Receiving Party is subpoenaed in another action, served with a demand in another action to which it is a party, or served with any other legal process by one not a party to this action seeking information which was produced or designated as Confidential by someone other than the receiving party, the receiving party shall transmit a copy of such subpoena, demand, or legal process, by hand or facsimile transmission, within three

business days of receipt of such subpoena, demand, or legal process, to the producing party and prepare timely objections to production of the Confidential Information. Should the person seeking access to the Confidential Information take action against the receiving party or anyone else covered by this Protective Order to enforce such a subpoena, demand, or other legal process, the receiving party shall respond by setting forth the existence of this Protective Order. Nothing herein shall be construed as requiring the receiving party or anyone else covered by this Protective Order to challenge or appeal any order requiring production of information covered by this Protective Order, subject itself to any penalties for noncompliance with any legal process or order, or seek any relief from this Court.

19. The inadvertent production in discovery of any privileged or otherwise protected or exempted information, as well as the inadvertent production in discovery of information without an appropriate designation of confidentiality, shall not be deemed a waiver or impairment of any claim or privilege or protection including but not limited to the attorney-client privilege, the protection afforded to work-product materials or the subject matter thereof, or the confidential nature of any such information, provided that the producing party shall immediately notify the Receiving Party in writing when inadvertent production is discovered. Upon receiving written notice from the producing party that privileged information or work-product material has been inadvertently produced, all such information, and all copies thereof, shall be returned to the producing party, and the Receiving Party and counsel shall not use such information for any purpose. Any analyses, memoranda or notes which were internally generated based upon such inadvertently-produced information shall immediately be destroyed.

20. Any violation of the terms of this Protective Order shall be punishable by money damages, interim or final injunctive or other equitable relief, sanctions, contempt of court


citation, or such other or additional relief as deemed appropriate by the Court. The foregoing remedies shall be in addition to any other common law or statutory relief available for violation of the terms of this Protective Order.

21. Discovery Material produced by third parties may be designated by them as Confidential Information pursuant to the terms of this Protective Order and, when so designated, shall be treated by the parties in conformance with this Protective Order.

22. The Court retains jurisdiction subsequent to settlement or entry of judgment to enforce the terms of this Protective Order.

AGREED:


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Sep. 9, 2004

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

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Attorneys for Plaintiff
Scimed Life Systems, Inc.

Sept 8, 2004

The parties, having entered into the above stipulation, and having shown good
cause herein, it is SO ORDERED:


Leon, J.

9/12/04

EXHIBIT A

LIST OF QUALIFIED PERSONS, paragraphs 5(c) and 5(d)

[illegible]

EXHIBIT B

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC.,

Defendant and Counterclaimant,

and ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:01CV2015 (RJL)

I hereby certify (i) my understanding that Discovery Material and/or Confidential Information are being provided to me pursuant to the terms and restrictions of the Protective Order (the "Order") entered by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (the "District Court") in this Action, and (ii) that I have read the Order. I understand the terms of the Order, I agree to be fully bound by the Order, and I hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the District Court for purposes of enforcement of the Order. I understand that violation of the Order may be punishable by contempt of court, or other sanction, penalty, injunction, or damages available at law or equity.

Dated: _____ Signature: _____

Name: _____

Address: _____

TAB 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FILED

DEC 14 2004

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff

v.

Case No. 1:01 CV 02015 RJL

MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC., and
ERIC C. MARTIN

Defendants

JOINT STIPULATED REQUEST TO EXTEND DISCOVERY

Plaintiff Scimed Life Systems, Inc. and Defendant Medtronic Vascular, Inc. jointly and respectfully request this Court to extend the discovery deadline and all subsequent dates in this case by two months.

The parties have engaged in written discovery with all deliberate speed. In order to avoid any duplication of efforts, however, depositions have not taken place pending the completion of all document production. Given the number of witnesses located in and outside the United States and the fast approaching holiday season, the parties jointly propose the following extensions of the dates set forth in the Court's Scheduling Order:

Close of factual discovery	February 1, 2005
Deadline for filing discovery motions	February 15, 2005
Service of expert reports on those issues as to which a party has the burden of proof	March 14, 2005

(2)

Service of expert reports on those
issues to which opposing party has the
burden of proof

April 15, 2005

Completion of expert depositions

May 25, 2005

Deadline for filing summary judgment
motions

June 22, 2005

(The parties are not precluded from filing summary judgment motions prior to this date.)

Opposition to summary judgment motions 21 days after filing of motion

Reply memorandum in support of
summary judgment motions

14 days after filing of opposition

Hearing on summary judgment motions

To be scheduled by Court

The pretrial conference

On or after July 25, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

Friebel / SKS

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Attorneys for Defendant
Medtronic Vascular, Inc.

It is so ORDERED

Dated November 2, 2004

Richard J. Leon

Honorable Richard J. Leon
United States District Judge

TAB 10

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant,

v.

MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC.,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Plaintiff,

and

ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Defendant.

Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL)

St
MEMORANDUM OPINION

(March **31**, 2006) [# 76, 100, 102, 103]

Plaintiff, Scimed Life Systems, Inc. ("Scimed"), brought this action against defendants, Medtronic Vascular, Inc. ("Medtronic") and Eric C. Martin, under Title 35 of the United States Code Section 146, challenging the Final Decision and Judgment of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the "Board") of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") regarding Patent Interference No. 104,192 between certain patent applications for an apparatus for reinforcing a bifurcated lumen. Presently before the Court are Medtronic's Motion for Summary Judgment, Scimed's First and Second Motions for Summary Judgment, and Medtronic's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and

Things. After due consideration of the parties' submissions, the relevant law and the entire record herein, the Court finds that the Board did not erroneously affirm its Grant of the Fogarty *et al.* United States Patent Application Serial No. 08/463,836 (now owned by Medtronic) Motion 12 in its July 27, 2001 Final Decision and Judgment. Accordingly, this Court affirms the Board's Final Decision and Judgment and, therefore, GRANTS Medtronic's Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES Scimed's First and Second Motions for Summary Judgment, and DENIES AS MOOT Medtronic's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Things.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Scimed and defendant/counterclaimant Medtronic are each assignees of record of two different patent applications for a bifurcated lumen invention.¹ Andrew Cragg and Michael Dake (collectively referred to as party "Cragg" in the underlying proceedings at the USPTO) filed an application with the USPTO regarding the bifurcated lumen apparatus on June 5, 1995. The application was assigned the serial number 08/461,402 (the "'402 application"). Cragg and Dake assigned all rights in the '402 application to Boston Scientific Technology, Inc., which later merged into plaintiff Scimed. Scimed is now the present legal owner of the '402 application. Medtronic was assigned its rights in a patent application for the same invention by Thomas J. Fogarty, Timothy J. Ryan, and Kirsten Freislinger (collectively referred to as party "Fogarty" in the underlying proceedings at the

¹ The "Background" section of this Memorandum Opinion has been partially adapted from this Court's earlier Memorandum Opinion in *Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic Ave Inc.*, 297 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2003).

USPTO). That application was also filed with the USPTO on June 5, 1995, and assigned the serial number 08/463,836 (the “836 application”). Party Fogarty assigned its rights in the '836 application to Medtronic Aneurx, Inc., which merged into Medtronic AVE, Inc. which later became the defendant/counterclaimant Medtronic. Medtronic is now the legal owner of the '836 application. Defendant/counterclaim-defendant Eric Martin owns patent No. 5,575,817 (the “Martin” or “817 patent”), based on application 08/293,541, filed on August 19, 2004.

On April 23, 1998, the USPTO Board declared an interference between Scimed's patent application (the “Cragg” or “402 application”), Medtronic's patent application (the “Fogarty” or “836 application”) and the Martin patent. This interference proceeding was assigned Interference No. 104,192, and is referred to as the “192 interference.”² On July 2, 1998, the Board set the following as the sole “count”³:

An apparatus for reinforcing a bifurcated lumen comprising:
a first section, configured to be positioned within the lumen, comprising:
an upper limb, configured to fit within the lumen upstream of the bifurcation;
a first lower limb, configured to extend into the first leg of said bifurcation
when said first section is positioned in the lumen, and

² “The purpose of an interference proceeding is to resolve the question of priority of invention when more than one applicant seeks a patent on substantially the same invention.” 3A-10 Donald S. Chisum, *Chisum on Patents* § 10.09[1][a] (2006). This action was brought in federal Court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 146, which allows a party dissatisfied with the decision of the Board in an interference to bring a civil action as long as the Board's decision is not being appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “and such appeal is pending or has been decided.” See 35 U.S.C. § 146.

³ “A count defines the interfering subject matter. In *In re Van Geuns* (1993), the Federal Circuit noted that (1) “[a]lthough claims of one or more of the parties may be identical to the count of an interference, the count is not a claim to an invention,” and (2) “[t]he count of an interference is merely the vehicle for contesting the priority of invention and determining what evidence is relevant to the issue of priority.” 3A-10 Donald S. Chisum, *Chisum on Patents* § 10.09[3] (2006).

a second lower limb, shorter than said first lower limb, and configured so that when said first section is positioned in the lumen, said second lower limb does not extend into a second leg of said bifurcation, and further comprising a second section configured to be positioned separately within the lumen and joined to said second lower limb of the first section, effectively extending said second lower limb into said second leg of said bifurcation.

Cragg et al. v. Martin v. Fogarty et al., Patent Interference No. 104,192, Paper No. 187, Final Decision and Judgment at 5-6 (United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences July 21, 2001) ("Board's Final Judgment"). The purpose of the '192 Interference was for the Board to determine who among the three parties had priority of inventorship, and was, therefore, entitled to the invention defined by the count.

At the time of declaration of the interference, party Cragg was accorded by the USPTO the benefit of the filing dates of two European patent applications (i.e. February 9 and June 10, 1994), which had been filed by a French Company known as Mintec SARL. At the time of declaration of the interference, party Fogarty, on the other hand, was accorded by the USPTO the benefit of the earlier filing date of U.S. patent application 08/255,681: i.e. on June 8, 1994. Thus, at the start of the interference, party Cragg was designated the "senior party,"⁴ on the basis of the accorded benefit date of February 9, 1994. On March 13, 2000, party Fogarty filed a preliminary motion attacking the benefit accorded party Cragg to

⁴ "In an interference proceeding, the first party to file is designated as the 'senior party' and all other parties as 'junior.' The junior party bears the burden of going forward with evidence as to actual reduction to practice prior to the senior party's filing date or conception prior to the senior party's filing date plus continuous and reasonable diligence during the critical period. If the senior party desires to show a date of conception or reduction to practice prior to his filing date, he bears the burden of going forward with evidence." 3A-10 Donald S. Chisum, *Chisum on Patents* § 10.03[1][c][ii] (2006).

the filing dates of the two European applications and sought to be made the senior party in the interference. On April 7, 2000, the Board granted party Fogarty's preliminary motion 12, declaring party Fogarty the senior party in the interference and party Cragg and party Martin as junior parties in the interference. *Cragg et al. v. Martin v. Fogarty et al.*, Patent Interference No. 104,192, Paper No. 130, Decision on Party Cragg's Motion to Correct the Preliminary Statement and on Party Fogarty's Preliminary Motion No. 12 at 7 (United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences April 24, 2000)("Decision on Preliminary Motion No. 12"). In that same opinion, the Board denied party Cragg's motion to amend its preliminary statement to name Michael D. Dake and Andrew H. Cragg as co-inventors of the party Cragg invention. *Id.* at 7. Party Cragg requested reconsideration of that decision claiming that the Board had erred in its ruling and claimed that Mintec filed the European applications as assignees of both Dake and Cragg, the co-inventors of the subject matter of the patent application.

On April 24, 2000, the Board issued a Decision on Reconsideration denying the request for reconsideration on the basis that Dake's assignment of his rights in the patent application came after the filing of the European application and that 35 U.S.C. § 119 could not be interpreted to allow Mintec the benefit of priority with this subsequent assignment of rights. *Cragg et al. v. Martin v. Fogarty et al.*, Patent Interference No. 104,192, Paper No. 138, Decision on Reconsideration (United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences April 24, 2000)("Board's Decision on Reconsideration"). In

its decision, the Board interpreted Title 35 of the United States Code Section 119 to require that "the previously filed foreign application must have been filed by the person or one who was, at the time of filing of the previously filed foreign application, already a legal representative or assign of that person." *Id.* at 3. The Board went on to state that their interpretation of Section 119 "is necessary to ensure a link between the presently involved application and the earlier filed foreign application with respect to the particular inventor. A contrary interpretation would cause entitlement to benefit to be negotiable as a commodity between unrelated entities." *Id.* In essence, the Board rejected party Cragg's position on the assignment of rights to the patent and stated:

We are unpersuaded that an assignment of ownership rights changes on whose behalf an application was previously already filed. It would appear that only filings subsequent to the assignment of rights from Michael D. Dake can be deemed as being executed or performed on his behalf.

Id. at 5. Party Cragg requested a final hearing for review of the Board's decision claiming that the Board had erroneously interpreted Section 119 and that Dake and Cragg were co-inventors and that Mintec SARL was the assignee of both Dake and Cragg for the subject matter invention even though the assignments occurred after the European patent applications were filed. *See id.* at 11-23. On July 27, 2001, the Board issued its Final Decision and Judgment. *See* Board's Final Judgment.

In its Final Judgment, the Board adopted its earlier interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 119. *Id.* at 9. The Board cited *Vogel v. Jones*, 486 F.2d 1068, 1072 (C.C.P.A. 1973), for the proposition that "a foreign application made by the assignee of a U.S. applicant, on behalf

of one other that the United States inventor, is irrelevant to the rights of priority of the U.S. inventor.” *Id.* at 10. The Board stated that the “plain statutory language” of Section 119 does not put “an assignee in the same position as if it were a ‘legal representative’ or ‘assign’ of the inventor at a previous time when a foreign application for the same invention was filed by that assignee.” *Id.* at 12. The Board found that Dake assigned his invention to Mintec, Inc. more than two years *after* the filing of the two European patent applications. *Id.* at 11-12. The Board went on to state, that even assuming that party Cragg’s preliminary statement identified both Cragg and Dake as co-inventors of the subject matter of the count, that fact would not help party Cragg as “Cragg also did not assign his rights to Mintec, Inc. until after” the two European patent applications were filed. *Id.* at 20. The Board found that “MINTEC SARL was not an assign of either Michael D. Dake nor Andrew H. Cragg when it filed European applications EP94400284.9 and EP94401306.9.” *Id.* For those reasons, and others, the Board found that there was no error in the granting of party Fogarty’s preliminary motion 12. *Id.* at 23.

On September 25, 2001, Scimed filed this appeal under Title 35 of the United States Code Section 146, seeking this Court’s review of the Board’s Final Decision and Judgment in the ‘192 Interference. The parties to this action entered into a stipulation and order limiting the issues in this case. The stipulated issue to be resolved is:

Whether the Board erroneously affirmed its Grant of Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) Motion 12 in its July 27, 2001 Final Decision denying Cragg *et al.* (Scimed) benefit of the February 9, 1994 filing date of its European application No.

94400284.9 as a date of invention for the subject matter of the single count in Interference No. 104,192.

(See Stipulation and Order entered March 25, 2004, Dkt. 50.) On July 22, 2005, both parties moved for summary judgment on this remaining issue and provided the Court with exhibits supporting their positions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary Judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the record demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); *see also Celotex v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); *Diamond v. Atwood*, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To determine which facts are "material," a Court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322; *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248. Additionally, to be a genuine issue of fact, it must be supported by sufficient admissible evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. *See Laningham v. United States Navy*, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

The moving party bears the initial burden of "identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." *See Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 323. In order to prevail on its motion for summary judgment,

the movant must show that the nonmovant "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." *Id.* at 322.

In opposing summary judgment, the "nonmoving party [must] go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 'admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" *Id.* at 324. The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, giving the nonmovant the benefit of all justifiable inferences derived from the evidence in the record. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 255 (1986). The nonmovant, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. *Id.* at 252.

In order for Scimed to prevail on summary judgment, Scimed must put forth evidence and legal support that meets the standard of proof this Court is required to apply when reviewing decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the USPTO. In determining whether or not the Board erroneously affirmed its Grant of party Fogarty's preliminary motion 12 and, therefore, erroneously awarded priority for the subject matter of the single count in the '192 Interference to Medtronic, this Court will apply the standard of proof set forth in *Morgan v. Daniels*, in that when a decision has been made by the Patent Office in an action contesting priority of invention, "the decision there made must be accepted as controlling upon that question of fact in any subsequent suit between the same parties, unless the contrary is established by testimony which in character and amount *carries*

thorough conviction.” *Morgan*, 153 U.S. 120, 125 (1894) (emphasis added) (determining the standard of review for a Patent Office decision when no additional evidence was put forth to the Circuit Court). Our Circuit Court, in *United States v. Szuecs*, 240 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1957), upheld the *Morgan* standard of proof that must be applied by a District Court when reviewing a decision of the Patent Office pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 146. “To reach a conclusion contrary to that of the Patent Office,” the *Morgan* standard requires the evidence to carry “‘thorough conviction.’” *Szuecs*, 240 F.2d at 887 (citing *Morgan*, 153 U.S. at 125) (reversing and remanding the case to the District Court to apply the correct standard of proof).

Another District Court Judge of this Court reaffirmed the application of *Morgan* in reviewing Patent Office cases under 35 U.S.C. § 146. *Anderson v. Anderson*, 403 F. Supp. 834, 844-45 (D.D.C. 1975) (affirming the decision of the Board of Patent Interferences after reviewing the full administrative record and hearing additional oral testimony), *aff’d*, 543 F.2d 1389 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 11, 1976). In *Anderson*, Judge John H. Pratt found that the “Patent Office is entitled to a presumption of correctness and regularity.” *Id.* at 844 (citing *Vogel v. Jones*, 346 F. Supp. 1005 (D.D.C. 1972)). Judge Pratt went on to reiterate that the District Court could not overturn the Board’s decision unless the evidence put forth by the movant carried “thorough conviction,” and “[t]he ‘thorough conviction’ standard imposes a heavy burden on plaintiffs in an action under 35 U.S.C. § 146,” and that “[a] mere preponderance of the evidence is not enough to justify reversing the Patent Office.” *Id.* at

845. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet its heavy burden, and concludes that the Board did not err in its interpretation of Section 119.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 119

In the Board's Final Judgment, it reaffirmed its earlier decision that the "plain statutory language" of Section 119 requires that the person who filed the foreign patent application must have been a legal representative or assign of the person who filed the patent application in the United States at the time that the foreign patent application was filed.⁵

Board's Final Judgment 9-10. The pertinent part of Section 119 reads:

(a) An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the United States or to citizens of the United States, or in a WTO member country, shall have the same effect as the same application would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign country.

35 U.S.C. § 119(a). The Board's interpretation of Section 119 is supported by *Vogel v. Jones*, 486 F.2d 1068 (C.C.P.A. 1973). See Board's Final Decision 10-11. In *Vogel*, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeal, the predecessor to the current Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, read Section 119 to mean "that an applicant for a United States patent can rely for priority on the 'first filed' application by an assignee on his behalf." 486 F.2d at

⁵ While counsel for Scimed is quick to point out its own grammatical analysis of Section 119 without citing to any grammar reference guide, the Court notes that it is quite capable of reading the statute, interpreting the language of the statute, researching the case law pertaining to the statute and applying that law to the present action.

1072. In order for the foreign patent application to be filed on behalf of the United States applicant, the person filing the foreign application must be an assignee or legal representative *at the time* that the foreign application was filed. *Id.* If the foreign applicant was allowed to become the legal representative or assign of the United States applicant *after* the foreign application was filed, it would be impossible for the foreign application to have been filed *on the behalf* of the United States applicant. If the Board or this Court held otherwise, the right of priority could be, as the Board noted, traded or sold as a commodity to the highest bidder. *See* Board's Decision on Reconsideration 3; Board's Final Decision 9. Therefore, this Court does not find that the Board erred in its interpretation of Section 119 and Scimed has neither cited any precedent or legislative history that would warrant interpreting the statute otherwise.⁶

⁶ Scimed argues that the Board's construction of Section 119 is inconsistent with the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, *opened for signature* Mar. 20, 1883, as amended at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 ("Paris Convention"), and asks this Court to find that the Board's erroneously construed Section 119 as the Board's construction is inconsistent with and violates Article 4 of the Paris Convention. While Section 119, and its predecessor R.S. 4887, were enacted in order to implement Article 4 of the Paris Convention, *Vogel*, 486 F.2d at 1072, the Board's construction of Section 119, which this Court finds correct, does not violate and is not inconsistent with the Paris Convention. The Paris Convention is not self-executing and, therefore, the U.S. was free to implement the Paris Convention in the manner and form that Congress deemed appropriate. *In re Dr. Matthais Rath*, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Congress executed Article 4 of the Paris Convention first with R.S. 4887, and then with Section 119, and Section 119 requires that in order to claim a right of priority in a foreign application, the foreign application must have been filed by the U.S. applicant or a person or entity who was a legal representative or assign of the U.S. applicant *at the time* that the foreign application was filed. The concern expressed by Scimed that upholding the Board's construction of Section 119 would have in foreign countries is conjecture and "based on pure speculation." *See Kawai v. Meilestics*, 480 F.2d 880, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1973).

B. Review of Board's Decision

Having found that the Board did not err in its reading and interpretation of Section 119, the question remains whether the Board erred in granting Medtronic's preliminary motion 12 seeking to deny Scimed the benefit of the filing date of its European patent applications. It did not. While a review by this Court of a Board's Final Decision is a "hybrid of an appeal and a trial de novo" because the Court considers evidence before the Board "as well as evidence that was not before the Board," *Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang*, 202 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting *Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A.*, 129 F.3d 588, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1997)), it nonetheless must treat the Board's decision as controlling "unless the contrary is established by testimony which in character and amount carries thorough conviction." *Morgan*, 153 U.S. at 125.


Scimed argues that the '284 European application was either filed on Dake's behalf "pursuant to the constructive trust imposed upon that application" when Mintec SARL filed the application, or a theory of an equitable assignment to party Cragg. (Scimed's Mem. of P&A in Opp'n to Medtronic's Mot. For Summ. J. 29, 35-36 ("Scimed's Opp'n"); Mem. of P&A in Supp. of Scimed's Second Mot. For Summ J. That Scimed is Entitled to the Priority of Its EP '284 Application Even Under the Board's Construction of 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)) 31-33 ("Scimed's Second Mot. For Summ. J.") As this Court earlier recognized, "[t]he Federal Circuit in *Conservolite [Inc., v. Widmayer]* held that a party's failure to raise the issue in a preliminary motion not only precluded it not from raising the matter at the final hearing, but

also precluded district Court review.” *Scimed Life Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.*, 297 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing *Conservolite, Inc. v. Widmayer*, 21 F.3d 1098, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). The Federal Circuit has stated that “[i]n order for an issue to have been raised adequately so that it qualifies for consideration in a § 146 proceeding, the issue should have been raised as specified in the PTO’s interference rules, for example, through preliminary motions, motions to correct inventorship, miscellaneous motions, belated motions delayed for good cause, or oppositions to these motions.” *Conservolite*, 21 F.3d at 1102. Therefore, Scimed is precluded from arguing that the Board erred in denying priority to Scimed either under the newfound constructive trust or equitable assignment theories advanced before this Court.

Thus, applying the *Morgan* standard of proof to this review and not having conducted a *de novo* review as in *Winner*, the Court finds that Scimed has not presented sufficient evidence that Mintec SARL was either the legal representative or assign of Dake or Cragg at the time that the relevant European patent applications were filed. Accordingly, party Cragg and Scimed cannot claim the benefit of priority of the European patent applications. Therefore, this Court finds that the Board did not err in its granting of party Fogarty’s (Medtronic’s) motion No. 12 which denied Cragg *et al.* (Scimed) the benefit of the earlier filing date of European application No. 94400284.9 and affirms the Board’s award of priority to Fogarty *et al.* (Medtronic) in its July 27, 2001 Final Decision and Judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant and counterclaim-plaintiff Medtronic's Motion for Summary Judgment [#100]; DENIES Plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Scimed's First Motion for Summary Judgment [#102]; DENIES Plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Scimed's Second Motion for Summary Judgment [#103]; and DENIES AS MOOT defendant and counterclaim-plaintiff Medtronic's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Things [#76]. An order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.


RICHARD J. LEON
United States District Judge

TAB 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SCIMED LIFE SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant ,

v.

MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC.,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Plaintiff,

and

ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant and Counterclaim-Defendant.

Civil Case No. 01-2015 (RJL)

FINAL JUDGMENT

For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion entered this date, it is, this

31st
day of March 2006, hereby

ORDERED that defendant and counterclaim defendant Medtronic Vascular, Inc.'s ("Medtronic") Motion to Compel Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Things [#76] is **DENIED AS MOOT**; and it is further


ORDERED that Medtronic's Motion for Summary Judgment [#100] is **GRANTED**; and it is further

ORDERED that Scimed Life Systems, Inc.'s ("Scimed") First Motion for Summary Judgment [#102] is **DENIED**; and it is further

ORDERED that Scimed Life Systems, Inc.'s ("Scimed") Second Motion for Summary Judgment [#103] is **DENIED**; and it is further

ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of defendant and counterclaim defendant Medtronic, that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences Final Decision and Judgment issued on July 27, 2001, is affirmed, and that the case is dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Richard J. Leon", written over a horizontal line.

RICHARD J. LEON
United States District Judge

TAB 12

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2006-1434

BOSTON SCIENTIFIC SCIMED, INC.
(formerly known as Scimed Life Systems, Inc.),

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, Inc.
(also known as Medtronic AVE, Inc.),

Defendant-Appellee,

and

ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant.

Gregory A. Castanias, Jones Day, of Washington, DC, argued for the plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Gidon D. Stern, Thomas E. Friebe, Catharina J. Chin Eng, and Brent P. Ray, of New York, New York.

Brian E. Ferguson, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for the defendant-appellee. On the brief were Paul Devinsky, John R. Fuisz, Stephen K. Shahida, and Natalia V. Blinkova. Of counsel were Joel M. Freed and Amanda E. Koenig.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Columbia

Judge Richard J. Leon

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2006-1434

BOSTON SCIENTIFIC SCIMED, INC. (formerly known as Scimed Life Systems, Inc.),

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, Inc. (also known as Medtronic AVE, Inc.),

Defendant-Appellee,

and

ERIC C. MARTIN,

Defendant.

DECIDED: August 8, 2007

Before MAYER, BRYSON and PROST, Circuit Judges.

MAYER, Circuit Judge.

Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. ("Scimed")* appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment affirming the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' final decision, which denied Scimed the priority benefit of an earlier-filed European patent application for the subject matter at issue in Patent Interference Number 104,192 ("the

* Plaintiff-appellant Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc., was formerly known as Scimed Life Systems, Inc., and will be referred to throughout this opinion as "Scimed."

'192 interference"). Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2006). We affirm.

Background

This appeal stems from an interference proceeding before the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Scimed and Medtronic Vascular, Inc. ("Medtronic") are each assignees of different United States patent applications covering the same invention. Andrew Cragg and Michael Dake (collectively "Cragg") filed patent application 08/461,402 ("the '402 application") for the invention in question on June 5, 1995. Cragg then assigned all rights in the '402 application to Boston Scientific Technology, Inc., which later merged into Scimed, the plaintiff-appellant and current legal owner of the '402 application. Also on June 5, 1995, Thomas J. Fogarty, Timothy J. Ryan, and Kirsten Freislinger (collectively "Fogarty") filed patent application 08/463,836 ("the '836 application") for the same invention. Fogarty assigned their rights in the '836 application to a company that eventually became Medtronic, the defendant-appellee and current legal owner of the '836 application. Eric Martin, a third-party to the instant appeal, owns U.S. Patent No. 5,575,817 (the "Martin patent" or "'817 patent"), which resulted from an application filed on August 19, 1994.

On April 23, 1998, the board declared an interference between Scimed's '402 application, Medtronic's '836 application, and Martin's '817 patent. The purpose of the interference was to determine which party had priority of inventorship, thereby entitling it to the invention as set forth in the sole count of the interference:

An apparatus for reinforcing a bifurcated lumen comprising:
a first section, configured to be positioned within the lumen,
comprising:

an upper limb, configured to fit within the lumen upstream of the bifurcation;

a first lower limb, configured to extend into the first leg of said bifurcation when said first section is positioned in the lumen, and

a second lower limb, shorter than said first lower limb, and configured so that when said first section is positioned in the lumen, said second lower limb does not extend into a second leg of said bifurcation, and further comprising

a second section configured to be positioned separately within the lumen and joined to said second lower limb of the first section, effectively extending said second lower limb into said second leg of said bifurcation.

Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty, Patent Interference No. 104,192, Paper No. 187, 2001 WL 1339890 at *2-3 (B.P.A.I. July 21, 2001) ("Final Interference Decision").

The board initially gave Cragg the benefit of the filing dates of two European patent applications filed by MinTec SARL ("MinTec"), a French company. The earlier of these dates was February 9, 1994. At the time these European applications were filed, no legal relationship existed between MinTec and Cragg, nor was MinTec acting on behalf of Cragg. Fogarty was granted the benefit of the filing date of U.S. patent application 08/255,681, which was June 8, 1994. Martin was accorded benefit of the application that led to the '817 patent, which was filed on August 19, 1994. Accordingly, the PTO initially designated Cragg as the senior party in the interference.

Fogarty responded by filing a motion attacking the priority benefit granted to Cragg. The board granted the motion, declaring Fogarty the senior party in the interference. After Cragg protested this decision, the board issued a final decision denying his request to be declared the senior party. The board ruled that Cragg was not entitled to priority benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 119 because neither Cragg nor Dake had assigned their rights to MinTec until after it had filed the European applications. Final Interference Decision, 2001 WL 1339890, at *5.

Scimed, the assignee of Cragg's U.S. patent application, then brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the board's final decision in the '192 interference. The district court affirmed the board's final decision, Scimed, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 61, and Scimed filed this appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

Discussion

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We also apply a de novo standard when reviewing questions of law, including a trial court's interpretation of statutory language. Pitsker v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 234 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

At issue here is whether 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)** permits an applicant for a United States patent to benefit from the priority of a foreign application previously filed by an entity that was not acting on behalf of the U.S. applicant at the time of filing. We hold that it does not.

A similar issue was addressed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Vogel v. Jones, 486 F.2d 1068 (CCPA 1973), which, to the extent relevant here, is binding upon us, South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982)

** 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) reads in relevant part:

An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the United States or to citizens of the United States, or in a WTO member country, shall have the same effect as the same application would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign country, if the application in this country is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such foreign application was filed

(en banc). According to Vogel, “§ 119 gives rise to a right of priority that is personal to the United States applicant.” 486 F.2d at 1072. Due to the personal nature of this right, an applicant for a U.S. patent may only benefit from the priority of a foreign application if it was filed by the U.S. applicant or “on his behalf.” Id.

Scimed argues that Vogel does not require the foreign applicant to have been acting on behalf of the U.S. applicant at the time the foreign application was filed. It points to the following passage in support:

This practice [of allowing a U.S. applicant to claim priority from a foreign application filed by someone else] arose because it was recognized that in many foreign countries, unlike in the United States, the actual applicant for a patent can be other than the inventor, e.g., an assignee. In light of this, we regard the language in § 119 referring to legal representatives and assigns to merely represent a codification of the actual practice under [the predecessor statute to § 119]. Since under United States law an application for patent must be made by the inventor, that practice was based on the requirement that the foreign application, regardless of the identity of the applicant, must have been filed for an invention actually made by the inventive entity seeking to rely upon it for priority purposes. We think § 119 must be construed to the same end.

Id. (footnote omitted). Scimed attempts to construe this language as permitting a U.S. applicant to benefit from a foreign application’s earlier filing date whenever “the invention described in the foreign application [is the same] one actually made by the U.S. applicant,” “regardless of the identity of the applicant’ of the foreign application.” According to its interpretation, “the Vogel court did not hold that the foreign application must have been filed by a person who was an assignee or legal representative of the U.S. inventor at the time the foreign application was filed, or that the foreign application must have been filed on his behalf in order for there to be priority benefit.” We disagree.

Vogel clearly held that the above-quoted passage “means that an applicant for a United States patent can rely for priority on the ‘first filed’ application by an assignee on his behalf.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, “the existence of an application made by [the inventor’s] assignee in a foreign country on behalf of one other than the United States inventor is irrelevant to his right of priority based on applications made on his behalf.” Id. In other words, while the foreign application must obviously be for the same invention and may be filed by someone other than the inventor, section 119(a) also requires that a nexus exist between the inventor and the foreign applicant at the time the foreign application was filed. Indeed, as a matter of pure logic, an entity could not have filed a foreign application “on behalf of” an inventor without the inventor’s knowledge or consent; that the foreign application may have been filed in accordance with the laws of the country in which it was filed has no bearing here. Therefore, to the extent that there may have been any uncertainty or ambiguity in Vogel, we now explicitly hold that a foreign application may only form the basis for priority under section 119(a) if that application was filed by either the U.S. applicant himself, or by someone acting on his behalf at the time the foreign application was filed.

Scimed also contends that the district court erred by precluding it from presenting evidence relating to theories of constructive trust and equitable assignment. A party may present new evidence to the trial court when appealing a board decision in an interference proceeding. Conservolite, Inc. v. Widmayer, 21 F.3d 1098, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A party may not, however, advance new legal theories at the trial court level, even if the overarching legal issue was presented below. See id. (“[A]n action under [35 U.S.C.] § 146 is essentially a proceeding to review the action of the Board. . . . [T]he

parties to an interference must make a complete presentation of the issues at the Board level so that the interference is efficient and not wasteful of administrative and judicial resources.”). Failure to advance legal theories before the board constitutes a failure to “make a complete presentation of the issues,” and permitting a party to raise those theories for the first time before the trial court would be both inefficient and “wasteful of administrative and judicial resources.” The parties stipulated that the only issue to be resolved by the district court was whether the board correctly ruled on Fogarty’s motion attacking the priority benefit initially granted to Cragg, Scimed, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 64, and Scimed did not raise either of these theories before the board, see Final Interference Decision, 2001 WL 1339890, at *3-10. The district court therefore did not err by precluding Scimed from presenting evidence to support these new legal theories.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is affirmed.

AFFIRMED